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ABSTRACT 
 
Full Name : [NABIL MOHAMMED ABDO MOHAMMED] 
Thesis Title : [Exploring software security approaches and their limitations in 
software development lifecycle  ] 
Major Field : [Information and Computer Science] 
Date of Degree : May ,2015 
 
Software security is only considered in the later stages of software development 
with the incorporation of security concerns as an afterthought. As a consequence, the risk 
of introducing new security vulnerabilities into various stages of software development 
lifecycles increases. Research evidence has proven that approaches to address security-
related concerns are insufficient and could likely cause costly reworks in addition to all 
the intangible consequences caused by a security breach. To avoid these costly mistakes, 
security concerns need to be addressed from the beginning of software development 
lifecycles all the way through to deployment and maintenance. Several approaches have 
been proposed in the literature for incorporating security into the SDLC from the 
requirements gathering phase until the maintenance and deployment, along with 
recommended tools to support a security-centric software development lifecycle. Despite 
the importance of these approaches, little research has been carried out to investigate 
these approaches and their limitations in a systematic manner.  In this thesis, we propose 
to explore and identify software security approaches and their limitations in the software 
development lifecycle. Systematic Literature Review (SLR) and Snowballing are the 
research methodology used to guide us in finding the answer of our research questions. In 
total, we selected and categorized 165 articles. Several software security approaches have 
xiii 
 
been identified that provided security checks in various software development phases, 
such as requirements, design, and coding. Also, the results show that the most frequently 
cited approaches are static analysis and dynamic analysis that provide security checks in 
the coding phase. Furthermore, this study shows that the significant number of studies in 
this review considered security checks around the coding stage of software development. 
Finally, the limitations of existing software security approaches of incorporating security 
check in to software development- whether for identified existing software security 
approaches or general challenges and limitations - are identified. This work assists 
software development organizations in better understanding the existing software security 
approaches used in the software development lifecycle and their limitations. It can also 
provide other researchers with a firm basis on which to develop new software security 
approaches and address any of the identified limitations. We hope that our research will 
facilitate any future research on enhance the identified software security approaches and 
address their limitations. 
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 ملخص الرسالة
 
 
 نبيل محمد عبده محمد  الكامل:الاسم 
 
  )CLDS(أمن البرمجيات وتحيدياتها في دروة تطوير البرمجيات أساليب استكشاف  :عنوان الرسالة
 
 ماجستير العلوم :العلميةالدرجة 
 
 التخصص: علوم الحاسب الألي
 
نشاطات وممارسات الأمن في المراحل  مع دمجتطوير البرمجيات  منيُهتم بأمن البرمجيات فقط في المراحل المتأخرة  تقليديا,
يات في ازدياد. الادلة غرات الأمنية الجديدة في مختلف مراحل تطوير البرمجنتيجة لذالك, فإن مخاطر إدخال الثاللاحقة . و
 erawtfoS(أثبتت أن الاساليب لمعالجة أمن البرمجيات في المراحل اللاحقه في دورة تطوير البرمجيات البحثية
بالاضافة الى ,مكلفة  أو مراجعة غير فعالة ويمكن على الارجح ان تسبب في اعادة صياغه )elcycefil tnempoleved
 ytiruces(المخـاوف الأمنية  , والثغرات الامنية رق الامني. لتجنب هذه الاخطاء المكلفةعواقب غير ملموسة الناجمه عن الخ
ينبغى معالجتها من بداية تطوير البرمجيات ابتداء من مرحلة جمع المتطلبات والتصميم وصولا الى كتابة الأكواد  )snrecnoc
البرمجيات الى دورة تطوير البرمجيات وث السابقة  لدمج أمن والصيانة والنشر. هناك العديد من الاساليب تم اقتراحها في البح
ابتداء من مرحلة جمع المتطلبات  وصولا الى الصيانة والنشر , جنبا الى جنب مع الادوات الموصى بها لدعم دورة تطوير 
اف هذه المناهج وتحدياتها البرمجيات. على الرغم من اهمية هذه الاساليب والمناهج , قليل من البحث تم تنفيذه لتحديد واستكش
بطريقة ممنهجة. في هذه الاطروحة , نقوم باستكشاف وتحديد اساليب ومناهج أمن البرمجيات وتحدياتها في دورة حياة تطوير 
, والذين يقومان )gnillabwonS(و السنوبولنج  )RLS(البرمجيات. طريقة البحث المستخدمة هي المراجعه الممنهجه للادب 
من مناهج واساليب أمن مقالا. العديد  561.في المجموع, تم اختيار وتصنيف  العثور على إجابة سؤال البحث لدينا بتوجيهينا في
والتحقيق الامني في دور حياة تطوير البرمجيات تم ايجادها واستكشافها ابتداء من مرحلة جمع  البرمجيات  التي تقدم الفحص
 citats(. بالاضافه الى ذالك , نتائج هذه الدراسه أظهرت ان التحليل الثابتالمتطلبات مرورا بتصميمها وكتابة الاكواد
اكثر ذكرا ودراسة في البحوث المنشورة في هذا الموضوع. ومن  )sisylana cimanyD(والتحليل الديناميكي )sisylana
خلال مرحلة كتابة الاكواد في ناحية اخرى اظهرت هذه الدراسة , ان عدد كبير من الدراسات اهتمت بتقديم الفحص الامني 
في سواء –دورة حياة تطوير البرمجيات. بالاضافة الى ذالك ,تم تحديد تحديات وعوائق مناهج واساليب تطوير أمن البرمجيات 
في دورة حياة تطوير البرمجيات. هذا العمل يساعد منظمات  -الاساليب الموجوده او العوائق العامة لتطوير برمجيات أمنه 
البرمجيات في فهم مناهج واساليب تطوير أمن البرمجيات خلال دورة حياة تطوير البرمجيات وتحدياتها. وكذالك هذه  تطوير
الدراسة تزود الباحثين والممارسين اساسا متينا لتطوير اساليب ومناهج جديدة لدعم تطوير برمجيات امنه وكذالك اقتراح حلول 
هج المنشورة مسبقا. نأمل أن هذه الرسالة ستسهل اي عمل في المستقبل في تحسين مناهج للعوائق والتحديات في الاساليب والمنا
 واساليب تطوير أمن البرمجيات وحل عوائقها وتحدياتها.
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1 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Software-intensive systems have become an inseparable part of our lives today. 
Our dependence on software systems is very high in several areas of our daily activities, 
such as telecommunications, financial services, electronics, home appliances, 
transportation, and more. As the software system is involved in various aspects of 
society, security becomes an important issue and a vital requirement for the software 
system. Many security issues such as confidentiality, availability and integrity need to be 
preserved in order to consider software as secure [1].  
Traditionally, software security is considered only in the later stages of software 
development, by incorporating security concerns as an afterthought. As a consequence, 
the risk of introducing new security vulnerabilities into various stages of software 
development lifecycles will be increased. Following the traditional method of securing 
Software has led to the Penetrate and Patch approach, in which the security specialist 
tries to assess the software by breaking it from its environment via exploiting common 
security vulnerabilities. Successful penetration leads to patch development and 
deployment of the identified vulnerabilities. Security has been always treated as an add-
on feature in the software development lifecycle, and is addressed by security 
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professionals using firewalls, proxies, intrusion prevention systems, antivirus and 
platform security. Software is at the root of all common computer security problems, 
hence the reason why hackers don’t create security holes, but rather exploit them. 
Security holes in software applications are the result of bad design and poor 
implementation of software systems and applications. Unfortunately, cryptographic 
components as well as other defensive mechanisms, such as intrusion detection systems 
and firewalls, which are supplemented to a software system towards the end of the 
development cycle, are insufficient and may lead to costly reworks [2]. Research 
evidence has proven that such approaches to address security-related concerns are 
insufficient and will likely cause costly reworks in addition to any intangible 
consequences caused by a security breach. To avoid these costly reworks, security 
concerns need to be addressed from the beginning of software development lifecycles 
(i.e. from the requirements gathering until deployment and maintenance). To this end, 
secure software engineering has recently become a very active area of research. Like all 
other engineering disciplines, software engineering involves a structured sequence of 
stages to develop a software product. These stages are known as the software 
development lifecycle. The main stages, whether using traditional or agile 
methodologies, are: requirements analysis, design, implementation, testing, deployment 
and maintenance. However, none of the traditional methodologies used for software 
development lifecycles have considered security as a deliverable in any of the stages of 
the lifecycle. Security has been always treated as an add-on feature in software, which 
explains the reason behind security bugs and flaws that are exploited by hackers today.  
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Therefore, the goal of secure software engineering is to target the software 
security vulnerabilities by considering security concerns and development approaches 
from the beginning of the software development lifecycles (i.e. from the requirements 
gathering until the end of the process). Secure software engineering is the procedure of 
achieving security purposes through build, design and test the software. Also, Software 
security is different from application security in that application security is about 
protecting software after development and deployment. It usually includes various 
protection mechanisms such as firewalls, antivirus and intrusion detection systems [3][4].  
Several approaches have been proposed in the literature that is used for incorporating 
security into the SDLC from the requirements gathering until maintenance and 
deployment, along with tools to support a security-centric software development 
lifecycle. Despite the importance of these approaches, little research has been carried out 
to investigate these approaches and their limitations in a systematic manner. 
During the last few years, a number of papers have focused on secure software 
development, some of which have carried out reviews and comparison studies on the 
issue. However, most of these reviews focused only on the secure software engineering at 
the requirements engineering phase of the SDLC and others concentrated only on special 
software development methodologies, such as Agile or XP. After performing preliminary 
searches aimed at both identifying existing systematic reviews and assessing the volume 
of potentially relevant studies, we can highlight a few works in a summary of a small 
group of security approaches in the security requirement of the requirements phase, such 
as [5]–[10], as well as a review of security approaches for specific domains such as web 
application[11]. There were also some reviews that investigated software security in 
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specific development methodologies such as agile and XP [12] [13]. However, none of 
them performed a review focused on software security approaches that cover all stages of 
software development lifecycles in a systematic manner and their limitations, and none of 
those reviews documented the systematic processes for selecting the initiatives (primary 
studies). Thus, there is a need to investigate the available security approaches and their 
limitations—as well as the stages in which these approaches are incorporated—in a 
systematic manner, to identify the gap in this area for further contribution by both the 
researcher and the practitioner. 
With this focus, the objective of this research is to identify an available 
approaches for secure software development in a systematic manner, through commonly 
used methodology in software engineering called a systematic literature review (SLR). 
An ultimate outcome of this research is to aid software development organizations with a 
sound knowledge of the existing secure software development approaches, as well as the 
stage in which these approaches are incorporated. Also, we will assist the software 
development organization in better understanding the limitations of existing software 
security approaches used in the software development lifecycle and to provide other 
researchers with a firm basis on which to develop new software security approaches. 
1.2 Thesis Objectives 
The overarching objective of this research is to identify the existing software 
security approaches used in the software development lifecycle as well as its limitations, 
and to provide other researchers with a firm basis on which to develop new software 
security approaches. 
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The objective of this research is two-fold: 
1. Identify different software security approaches used in the software development 
lifecycle.  
RQ1: What approaches are available for secure software development? 
RQ2: At which stage of the software development lifecycle is the software security 
approach incorporated? 
RQ3: Which researchers are most active in software security? 
RQ4: What are the main venues for publications on software security?  
2. Identify the existing limitations of software security approaches used in SDLC.  
RQ5: What are the limitations of software security approaches used in the software 
development lifecycle? 
A systematic approach will be employed with the intention of achieving the thesis 
objectives to identify the software security approaches for building security from the 
beginning of the software development lifecycles, as well as the possible existing 
limitations of these security approaches. This approach will be implemented by using the 
concepts of “systematic literature review” (SLR). Additionally, snowballing from the list 
of references of the identified articles used is another method used in this research (i.e., to 
identify additional relevant articles through the references lists of the articles found using 
the search strings, as well as the articles identified through manual search using Google 
Scholar to answer the (RQ5). Both backward snowballing from the lists of references and 
forward snowballing which is finding the citations to the papers, were included in this 
research. 
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The contribution of the thesis assists software development organizations in better 
understanding the existing software security approaches used in the software 
development lifecycle and its limitations, as well as to provide other researchers and 
practitioners with a firm basis, solid foundation and a body of knowledge on which to 
develop new software security approaches. 
The following approaches are used as a guide for answering our research 
questions: 
1. Identify different software security approaches used in the software development 
lifecycle by using the systematic literature review methodology. 
2. Identify, through the use of snowballing, the existing limitations of software 
security approaches used in the software development lifecycle. 
3. Analyze the results of step 1 and 2 to provide a comprehensive knowledge and to 
achieve our objectives. 
1.3 Research Methodology 
In order to achieve our objectives, we have designed an appropriate research 
methodology in which data will be collected from the published literature (i.e., a 
systematic literature review process and snowballing). These two processes will give us 
confidence in the reliability of the data collected. A systematic literature review is a 
defined and methodical way to summarize the empirical evidence concerning a treatment 
or technology, in order to identify missing areas in current research, or to provide 
background in order to justify new research. A systematic literature review requires 
considerably more effort than conventional literature reviews, but provides a much 
stronger basis for making claims about research questions [14]. Hence, the SLR was an 
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appropriate research method for our research, which is aimed at identifying the software 
security approaches for building security from the beginning of SDLC. We will follow 
the SLR guidelines proposed by Kitchenham and Charters [14] for performing the SLR, 
which contains three main processes identified: 
1) Planning the review: By specifying the research questions and developing the 
review protocol which contains the search strategy, and by identifying search strings 
derived from the research questions, scopes and methods. Additionally, the quality 
assessment of selected studies as well as the inclusion and exclusion criteria and data 
extraction forms will be used. 
2) Conducting the review: By identifying relevant researches and selecting the 
primary studies from them, we will then assess the study quality, extracting the required 
data. Finally, we will synthesize the extracted data, checking the most frequent 
approaches that are used for incorporating security concerns into the SDLC and the most 
frequent phases where the security approaches are emphasized. This categorization will 
help in identifying the most neglected stage in terms of security so that new room can be 
opened for further research. Additionally, we will analyze studies based on the countries 
where they were conducted, the active researchers and on the publication venue of the 
primary studies that contribute to the topic. 
3) Reporting the review: We will write up the final report. 
After the results (i.e., software security approach for building security into software 
development lifecycles) have been identified by SLR, we will identify the possible 
limitations and challenges of incorporating security into the SDLC using snowballing 
from the list of references of the identified articles via the SLR and the articles identified 
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through manual search using Google Scholar. Both results will build a comprehensive 
mapping study about building security from the ground up through integrating security 
into the SDLC. 
Our research methodology and approach can hence be summarized into the 
following phases: 
Phase 1: Systematic Literature Review (SLR) 
In the first phase we will start the systematic literature review. We have identified 
the primary resources and research database as follows: ACM Digital Library, 
ScienceDirect, IEEEXplore, SprinerLink and John Wiley Online Library. 
Phase 2: Snowballing 
In this phase, we will identify the limitations and challenges of software security 
approaches for building security into the SDLC using snowballing from the list of 
references of the identified articles via SLR and the articles identified through manual 
search using Google Scholar. 
Phase 3: Interpretations and Analysis 
The results compiled from the SLR and snowballing will be interpreted and 
analyzed in alignment with research objectives in order to answer the research questions. 
Phase 4: Conclusion 
The conclusion of the entire effort of this research will be presented. 
Phase 5: Thesis Writing 
Complete the thesis write-up. 
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1.4 Thesis Outline 
The remaining sections of the thesis are organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents 
basic terminology and background information on software security and secure 
development. Chapter 3 presents the state-of-the-art literature review in the field pointing 
out the gaps in the literature which is addressed by this thesis. The literature review will 
compose a body of knowledge necessary to justify our purpose of the research. Chapter 4 
addresses the research methodology of our research. Results are illustrated in tabulated 
and charted format in chapter 5. It will be accompanied by extensive interpretation and 
analysis in alignment with the research objectives. Chapter 6 draws a conclusion on our 
research.  
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2 CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents basic terminology and background information on software 
security and software development lifecycles. Section 2.1 explains software security 
concepts, while section 2.2 presents the software development lifecycles, concepts and 
activities, and section 2.3 and section 2.3 discuss security into the SDLC and the 
important of a systematic literature review. 
2.1 Software Security 
 
I. Software security concepts: 
There are some definitions of software security that has been found in the literature as 
follows: 
-“Software Security is the ability of the software to resist, tolerate, and recover from 
events that intentionally threaten its dependability.” [3] 
-“Software Security is about building secure software: designing software to be secure, 
making sure that software is secure, and educating software developers, architects, and 
users about how to build secure things.” [15] 
-“The idea of engineering software that continues to function correctly under malicious 
attack.”  [16] 
-“The process of designing, building, and testing software for security.” [15] 
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-“Defends against software exploits by building software to be secure in the first place, 
mostly by getting the design right (which is hard) and avoiding common mistakes ."  [17] 
 
-“Software Security is a system-wide issue that takes into account both security 
mechanisms (such as access control) and design for security (such as robust design that 
make software attacks difficult).” [15] 
Software security has been defined by different people, and no standard definition 
has been agreed upon. We can observe that most of the above definitions are concerned 
about building secure software which is actually means to design and implement secure 
software from the beginning of software development. 
II. Software security terminology 
 Asset is anything valuable, and needs to be protected. It is the “target of threats, 
the possessors of exposures, or the beneficiary of countermeasures”. According to 
McGraw and his colleagues [18], several things could be considered as an asset, such as 
components or complete systems, information or data stored by software, code—whether 
binary or source, and services supplied by the software. Also, severe consequences such 
as physical injury, financial loss, and sometimes even death due to the effective 
exploitation any of these assets [18].  
 Software vulnerability is "a weakness in the security system, for example, in 
procedures, design, or implementation that might be exploited to cause loss or harm" 
[19]. The errors in the software may make it vulnerable, and these errors can be found in 
different stages such as requirement specification, design, or coding of a system [19]. 
Software vulnerabilities are classified  into two main categories  [3] : 
12 
 
 Design-level: at this level, the vulnerability may occur as a result of a design flaw. 
 Implementation-level: at this level, the vulnerability may occur as a result of a 
bug in the code. In this type, the attackers can exploit the vulnerability easily to achieve 
their purposes. 
Defect is a latent problem that lays for years  [20]. 
Bug Problem that exists in the code during the implementation stage [3]. 
 
 Software Security Error 
In the literature, the researchers use the term vulnerability instead of error and most 
of the authors do not differentiate between them [21]. It has been defined as "a tangible 
manifestation of a mistake in any of the SDLC artifacts (requirement specifications, 
design, or source code) of a piece of software that leads to a vulnerability" [21][22]. 
 A software security error is categorized into three types of errors: 
a) Requirement error: this error can happen due to an incorrect or missing 
requirement as a result of a mistake made by the requirement engineer who is responsible 
for specifying the requirements. 
b) Design error - improper logical decision (whether in the representation of the 
decision or in the decision itself) in the design phase of the software development 
lifecycles. 
c) Coding error - mistake made by the coder (implementer) in the implementation 
stage of software development lifecycles that leads to represent the design decision 
incorrectly in the source code. 
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 Software Security Requirements 
Software security requirements are the requirements that are needed in order to 
mitigate software security errors in the software development lifecycle [22]. More 
precisely, a software security requirement can be considered as a constraint or control 
which will mitigate the chance of vulnerability if it is implemented in a suitable manner. 
More attention should be given to software security requirements that are specified for 
any SDLC artifact because a software security error can exist at any stage of the software 
development lifecycles artifact [22]. 
 Risk 
The risk is the product of the probability of the occurrence of the attack multiplied 
by the damage of that successful attack on different assets of the software [18][22]. 
 Risk Specification  
Risk specification or risk analysis is calculating the risk. This process could be done 
in any stage of SDLC. Risk analysis concerns existing vulnerabilities, attacks and their 
impacts, and the likelihood of future attacks [22][18]. Also, threat modeling [19] is an 
approach for identifying the possibility of the threats to a piece of software. This 
approach considers the software assets, occurrence of the attack and attackers’ goals. 
 Attack Surfaces  
Possible access points that help the attacker (whether an entity or a person) with 
potential interaction with the software and intentionally attempting to attack it, such as 
user interfaces, data files and configuration files. The more entry points, the more attack 
surfaces and vice versa. 
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III. Software security and information security 
Nowadays, software is the critical issue in computer security since software holes 
are prevalent, and the problem is still growing. Moreover, the problem may become much 
worse in the future due to the fact that [23]: 
 New software operates in networked environments which is vulnerable to many 
hostile attacks.  
 New systems that are extended by Java VMs and .Net runtime environments 
become more popular, which lead to mobile code risk.  
 The number of complicated and complex types of software is growing.  
The fundamental way of solving computer security problems is by making software 
secure. However, the question here is, “What is the most effective way to protect 
software from vulnerability?” To answer this question, the difference between a software 
security and an application security are clarified. The software security is about design 
and implement secure software through building secure software from the beginning of 
SDLC. This concept addresses critical issues such as software security requirements, 
designs for security, security flaws and security tests. It is mostly concerned with 
designing and implementing software to be secure, as well as training software 
developers, designers, and users about securing the software through the design, 
implementation and testing of software before deployment [2] [10].  
Application security is about protecting the software after development. This 
concept addresses critical issues such as protecting against malicious code, input 
validation of the program, and making software use certain policies with technological 
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solutions. Application security is mainly about looking for security problems and fixing 
them after the attacker exploits them. However, this approach concerns security 
symptoms in a reactive way, ignoring the original cause of the problem. 
Both concepts are related to the idea of the prevention of software exploitation. 
Software security mitigates the chance of exploitation through building the secure 
software in the early stages of development, mostly by incorporating security into the 
SDLC. On the other hand, application security mitigates the chance of exploitation by 
enforcing reasonable policy about what kinds of things can run, how they can change and 
what the software does as it runs [2] [10]. 
In order to develop better software, building the software to be secure in the first 
place by solving problems that are found in the design and implementation stage of 
software, is better than finding and fixing security problems after the software is built 
[23]. This will reduce the overall development cost of a product and this is what we are 
care about in this research. 
 
IV. How is security addressed? 
A number of approaches have evolved to address software security. Following are 
three major approaches used to address security in software [24]. 
 Penetrate and patch 
 Secure operational environment 
 Secure software engineering 
In the penetrate and patch approach, a software product is released to the public 
after completion. Any vulnerability found is fixed by applying patches. Although it is the 
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most common approach, to apply patches after finding vulnerabilities is a hundred times 
[24]–[26] more expensive than if the issues were fixed during development. Most of the 
time, more vulnerabilities are introduced while applying patches [11] [13] [14]. Securing 
the operational environment [24] relies on the external devices to the software systems 
such as firewalls and protection mechanisms. It can provide external security to the 
software, but helps very little against design and implementation attacks. Moreover, 
operational environment security is only possible after launching the operational product 
[24]. The idea behind secure software engineering is to implement well-structured 
processes and mechanisms from the early phases of software development (i.e., 
requirement elicitation) [24]. Secure software engineering starts from the requirements 
phase and is reflected in the entire stage of the SDLC [28]–[31]. 
 
i. The need for software security:  
Software security has not been given the appropriate attention in recent years. This 
does not mean that it has not been discussed before, but it would seem that there are some 
misunderstandings in the concept and the way it should be practiced. A group of 
researchers and authors began publishing security books in 1999, and started discussing 
the best way to incorporating security into systems [32]. Incorporating security is often 
considered as an add-on feature to a system when the development lifecycle is completed. 
In many organizations, the responsibility of security is left to a few infrastructure people 
who set up the intrusion detection (IDS), antivirus and firewalls [15]. These people are 
not developers, architects or designers.  
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The concept of software security has been neglected by requirement analysts, 
software implementers, and design architects. They have given it little or no attention 
during the development process, which leads to dire consequences as security problems 
show up in the software.  CERT (CERT/CC) Coordination Centre has reported about 
90% of the security problems due to the exploitation in the development and design flaws 
[32] and more of them due to bad style in the coding, such as BOF and XSS. Also, these 
flaws have been exploited even with the existence of the security afterthought approaches 
such as firewalls, intrusion detectors and antivirus programs. 
In addition to the factors mentioned above, many other factors need to be 
considered that support the need for software security, such as connectivity, complexity 
and extensibility [33]. Software is getting bigger and bigger in size due to having to deal 
with huge tasks. This has led to a lot of flaws at the design and coding levels. Also, 
extensibility can help in providing a cheaper way to update the software such as in 
Microsoft’s .Net and Sun Microsystems’ Java that accept code and update. This feature 
can lead to making the software vulnerable to malicious code. Furthermore, during the 
last decade, there has been a huge evolution related to connectivity. The growth of local 
area networks and wireless area networks, as well as the internet, has modernized the 
connectivity in the world of computers. This helps the attacker to hack systems through 
remote access from the networks. All of these factors help attackers to achieve their 
purposes and make software easier to exploit.  
Due to ineffective techniques such as antivirus programs, intrusion detectors and 
firewalls, neglecting the notion of security among architectures, designers and 
developers, and the lack of awareness of security in the SDLC, the techniques of process 
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improvement suggest finding better ways of incorporating security into software. This 
can be done by building security in such a way that security aspects are injected into the 
SDLC, and awareness should be created between stakeholders, developers, architects and 
developers—all of whom are involved in the software development process. 
 
V. Traditional approaches for software security 
Software security has been viewed as a set of firewall tools, encryption and testing 
that incorporate security into software development. A group of developers usually 
consider that a software shipment with firewall tools and authentication could be more 
than enough for securing software. Also, many software builders and security 
practitioners consider software security as an add-on feature to the software system. 
"Present software engineering practice in the industry does not lead to secure software at 
all" [34]. Unfortunately, for the last few years, many software practitioners and software 
builders consider software security as one of the quality features that need to be dealt 
with when product is shipped, or before deployment.  
More recently, there is an incomplete view that has been suggested by security and 
industry experts, practitioners, and researchers about software security. In early 2002, an 
alert flag was raised about the importance of building secure software, by Trustworthy 
Computing Initiative [34]. In 2004, Michael Howard, a security expert at Microsoft, 
warned about this problem: "Few software developers follow security best practices to 
produce more secure code. Worse, they think of security after the fact. But it's a mistake 
to separate security consideration from the general software development process." [35] 
Many other security researchers have fought the traditional methods of software security, 
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such as Gary McGraw: "Software security is not just about building security functionality 
and integrating features!” He also clarifies that  "just as you can't test quality into a piece 
of software, you can't spray paint security features onto a design and expect it to become 
secure." [3] 
 
2.2 Software Development Lifecycles (SDLC) 
The software development lifecycle is a methodology for the design and 
implementation of software solutions. Furthermore, a methodology may be defined as a 
formal approach to solving a problem, based on a structured sequence of procedures. The 
use of a methodology, therefore, ensures a rigorous process; it avoids missing any steps 
that could lead to compromising the end goal. It can therefore be argued that using a 
methodology increases the probability of success.  
Peters et al. [36] define the software development lifecycle as “the period of time 
beginning with a concept for a software product and ending whenever the software is no 
longer available for use.” Such a methodology represents the activities, their inputs and 
outputs, and any interactions during the software’s lifecycle. Various software 
development lifecycle methodologies exist, including the waterfall, incremental, spiral, 
prototyping, evolutionary, object-oriented and agile models. 
 
Figure 1: Typical phases of SDLC [37] 
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An important feature of the software development lifecycle is that it is a 
comprehensive method that encompasses five primary phases of software development, 
namely: investigation, analysis, design, implementation and maintenance, as depicted in 
Figure 1. 
Although Figure 1 illustrates these phases as being applied in a sequential and linear 
manner, an iterative approach, as indicated in Figure 2, is more common. Since an 
iterative process is essentially circular in nature, each phase receives input from and 
provides output to another. At a high level, this circularity ensures the re-assessment of 
the quality of each artifact. 
 
Figure 2: A Typical Iterative Cycle for Developing Software Solutions[37]  
 
The five standard phases and their related activities are discussed in sub-sections 1, 2, 3, 
4 & 5.  
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1. The Investigation Phase 
During the investigation phase, the objectives, constraints and scope of the project 
are specified. It is during this phase that the problem definition and high-level 
requirements are established. The problem definition provides an initial description of the 
problem area, and it provides a firm foundation for the rest of the project. It typically 
takes the form of a written report and includes the current problems—as stated by the 
various stakeholders and interpreted by the developer—the objectives of the new system, 
and the scope and size of the project. The documentation produced during this phase 
requires user involvement. The problem definition report can be considered as the first 
stage in constructing the requirements specification document [38]. 
2. The Analysis Phase 
Several basic activities of systems analysis need to be performed, whether 
developing a new application quickly or developing a long-term project. The analysis 
phase begins with a study of the documentation gained during the investigation stage. 
However, systems analysis is not a preliminary study, but an in-depth study of the 
detailed requirements. This phase produces a set of functional requirements that are used 
as the basis for the design of a new or improved software application. The functional and 
non-functional requirements are typically documented with text, use case diagrams, data-
flow diagrams and other relevant figures, depending on the methodology followed.  
3. The Design Phase 
Whereas the systems analysis phase describes ‘what’ a software application should 
do to meet the identified requirements, the systems design phase specifies ‘how’ the 
application will accomplish these requirements. The systems design consists of various 
design activities that produce system specifications satisfying requirements specified in 
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the systems analysis phase. The objective of systems design is to describe the new 
software solution as a collection of modules or sub-systems. The systems design phase 
will indicate ‘how’ the new software application will be implemented, by providing all 
the necessary details, including data inputs, system outputs, processing steps and database 
designs. An important tool for software engineers is the Unified Modeling Language 
(UML) and its various diagrams, including use case, sequence and state transition 
diagrams. The output of this stage consists of a complete technical specification of the 
new software application [39]. 
4. The Implementation Phase 
Once a new software solution has been designed, it must be implemented. During 
the implementation phase, the software application is physically built. This requires that 
program code is written and tested, and supporting documentation is produced including 
complex program listings, detailed test plans and instructions for operating procedures 
[39]. 
5. The Maintenance Phase 
Once a software application is fully implemented and is being used in business 
operations, the maintenance phase begins. Software maintenance may be defined as the 
monitoring, evaluating and modifying of operational applications to make any desirable 
or necessary improvements [37].  
 Traditional Software Development 
The waterfall model is the oldest known SDLC model. It was first identified in 
1970 as a sequence of activities from the requirements gathering until the coding stage. It 
describes a sequence of activities that begins with concept exploration and concludes 
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with maintenance and eventual replacement, as shown in Figure 3. Peters et al. [36] refer 
to it specifically as the forward engineering of software products. 
 
Figure 3: The Traditional Waterfall Mode 
The application of the waterfall model, because of its inherent weaknesses, should 
be limited to those situations in which their requirements and their implementation are 
well understood.  Large mainframe or complex client-server systems, and systems with 
highly complex technical requirements, may continue using this traditional approach. 
However, since it is not practical for most of the current applications which are running 
on highly networked PCs and workstations, a number of alternative software 
development models have emerged over recent years. 
 Alternative Software Development Models 
Various software development models have evolved from attempts to optimize the 
waterfall model. Modern software development processes are invariably iterative and 
incremental. This means that details are typically added in successive iterations allowing 
for changes and improvements to be introduced as needed. Incremental development 
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allows for a number of releases of software modules, thereby maintaining user 
satisfaction and providing important feedback to modules still under development [40]. 
There are many representations of the SDLC to choose from; all illustrating a 
logical flow of activity from the identification of a need through to the final software 
product. These methodologies use all the standards and procedures which will affect the 
planning, requirements gathering, analysis, design, development and implementation of a 
software system. Each SDLC model has its own strengths and weaknesses, and may 
therefore be better suited to certain types of projects within an organization. The expected 
size and complexity of the system, development schedule, and lifespan of a system will 
affect the choice of which SDLC model to use.  
1. The incremental/evolutionary model 
The product is said to evolve within the incremental/evolutionary lifecycle model 
because it consists of the planned development of multiple releases. Generally, 
increments become smaller and implement fewer requirements each time. It typically 
entails the continual overlapping of development activities and produces a succession of 
software releases. However, it can be costly if it is assumed that a current release is 
superseded by an improved version of the software later [41]. 
2. The spiral model 
The spiral lifecycle model, introduced by Boehm in 1986, combines many good 
features of other software development models. These include the idea of baseline 
management (i.e., the documents associated with cycle phases), apparent in the waterfall 
model, the overlapping phases which are found in the incremental model, and early 
versions of a software application from the prototyping model. These software 
development models can be coupled with the spiral model in a natural way [42]. 
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3. Extreme programming 
Extreme programming is one of the earliest and most important of the Agile 
methodologies. It is a relatively new concept, but is in many ways an extension of the 
earlier work in prototyping and RAD. The main premise of XP is that the SDLC and its 
many alternatives are too large and cumbersome. Many of them provide good control but 
they typically end up adding complexity, taking more time, and slowing down 
programmers. XP simplifies the development process by focusing on small releases, 
similar to prototyping, that add value to the customer. 
 
2.3 Security in the SDLC 
Thinking about security at the early stages of software development by injecting 
security aspects could be achieved by looking for an already-existing software 
development model that provides security by design, or by trying to find some security 
principles that could be injected into each phase of the SDLC. 
Tompkins et al. [43] found that as far back as 1985, inadequacies in the design and 
operation of computer applications were a frequent source of security vulnerabilities 
associated with information systems. This led them to state that “Security concerns 
should be an integral part of the planning, development and operation of a software 
application.” Furthermore, they suggested that the SDLC methodology provides the 
structure to ensure that security safeguards are planned, designed, developed and tested in 
a manner that is consistent with the sensitivity of the information. 
Tompkins et al. [43] found in the research that much of what needs to be done to 
improve security is not clearly separable from what is needed to improve the usefulness, 
reliability, effectiveness and efficiency of computer applications. However, they stress 
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that while security concerns should be integrated into the SDLC, steps should be taken to 
ensure that the appropriateness, adequacy and reasonableness of security safeguards be 
separately identifiable activities within each stage of the SDLC. This means that system 
planners, developers and users should accomplish a series of security-related actions 
throughout the SDLC. The process for incorporating security safeguards within an 
application, however, is not substantially different from the SDLC activities. Similarly, 
Jones et al. [44] state that to meet future demands, opportunities and threats associated 
with information security need to be “baked in” to the overall SDLC process. The reality 
is that information security is an afterthought for many organizations. This means that, 
most often, security is not an integral part of their business or information strategies, nor 
is it woven into their IT projects. Jones et al. [44] are concerned that traditional firewall 
systems have become less effective in preventing or detecting web-based attacks. They 
suggest that central to many successful system attacks currently are poorly developed 
systems and applications. Many of the security properties that are repeatedly outlined in 
government and other regulations, including accountability, unique user accounts and 
confidentiality, can be circumvented when software developers have not paid enough 
attention to security in the design, development, deployment and maintenance of their 
products. They argue that if the security considerations for systems were woven into the 
SDLC, and if the developers, project managers, and system architects were given 
adequate training, many of the security vulnerabilities that manifest themselves in 
software applications would never appear. Security plays an increasingly important role 
within systems’ development. This can be attributed to the increase in the number of 
distributed applications. Breu [45] argue that security is a requirement that has to be 
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considered at all stages of development, and which needs particular modeling techniques 
to be captured. 
2.4 The Important of a Systematic Literature Review 
 
A systematic literature review is supposed to be a good guideline as a scientific 
method of research in the field of software engineering. It’s also widely used and 
promoted in university environments. Kitchenham describes the importance of a 
systematic approach as: “Unless a literature review is thorough and fair, it is of little 
scientific value” [14]. In these terms, “systematic” means that others following the exact 
steps described in the article will achieve the same results and find the same resources as 
the article describes. The interpretation can be different, but it should not be possible to 
simply skip resources not fitting your thesis. In other words, the review can be 
reproduced by a third party and all they need is the description in the review itself. This 
intends to make sure that a research doesn’t support only the preferred hypothesis of the 
researcher but also outlines the research that contradicts its own hypothesis. Another 
reason why I chose the systematic literature review is that in software engineering we 
find many studies covering different topics, but they often lack the scientific quality and 
reproducibility which we can find, for example, in medical research. The approach of a 
systematic literature review is to try to get more quality into the science of software 
engineering. A systematic literature review requires considerably more effort than a 
conventional literature review, but provides a much stronger basis for making claims 
about research questions [14]. 
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During the last few years, a number of papers have focused on secure software 
development, some of which have carried out reviews and comparison studies on the 
issue. However, most of these reviews focused only on the secure software engineering at 
the requirements engineering phase of the SDLC and others concentrated only on special 
software development methodologies, such as Agile or XP. After performing preliminary 
searches aimed at both identifying existing systematic reviews and assessing the volume 
of potentially relevant studies, we can highlight a few works in a summary of a small 
group of security approaches in the security requirement of the requirements phase, such 
as [5]–[10], as well as a review of security approaches for specific domains such as web 
application[11]. There were also some reviews that investigated software security in 
specific development methodologies such as agile and XP [12] [13]. However, none of 
them performed a review focused on software security approaches that cover all stages of 
software development lifecycles in a systematic manner, and none of those reviews 
documented the systematic processes for selecting the initiatives (primary studies). Thus, 
there is a need to investigate the available security approaches and their limitations—as 
well as the stages in which these approaches are incorporated—in a systematic manner, to 
identify the gap in this area for further contribution by both the researcher and the 
practitioner. 
 Hence, an SLR was an appropriate research method for our research which aims 
to highlight the security approaches used for incorporating security concerns into 
software development lifecycles from the requirements gathering stage until maintenance 
and deployment, and identifies the possible limitations of doing so from the early stages 
of the SDLC. 
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3 CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter we present a brief review of the related and current literature with 
respect to integrating security into software development lifecycles and the work that has 
been done in this area. Secure software development and the idea of building security as 
an integral part of the SDLC are discussed in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 gives an overview 
of the existing work carried out so far in secure software development. 
3.1  Secure Software Development  
One of the key areas of concern is that of secure software development. It is 
important to note that the term ‘software’ is used and not that of ‘system’, since an 
information system is broadly defined as an organized combination of people, hardware, 
software, communication networks and data resources. Although the focus of this thesis 
is on the software aspect of an information system, it is understood that this cannot be 
studied in isolation, without any consideration of the other components [46]. Data 
comprise a critical asset to any organization; and they, therefore, need protection [46] . 
Software applications can be seen as the agents and processors of data. Although most 
organizations today have strong network perimeter controls in place, internally their 
applications and data are mostly left unprotected. Unfortunately, in many cases of 
software development, security is a mere afterthought [47]. According to Daud et al. [48], 
security typically goes unnoticed in the early phases of the software development life 
cycle. A good software engineering approach, however, is to consider security throughout 
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the software development lifecycle. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to adopt a 
process that incorporates all aspects of software development in secure software 
applications. Therefore, there exists a need to update and improve the current software 
development approaches. Process improvements should be added at every step of the 
software development lifecycle, regardless of the particular methodology chosen, to 
better focus on security issues. 
Taylor and Azadegan [49] support this guideline, and state that: “Building secure 
systems requires incorporating security principles early and often throughout the software 
development life cycle.” Software security should be an integral part of the development 
process; and it should be incorporated at every phase of the SDLC. Similarly, Microsoft 
supports the idea of injecting security into the SDLC “from the ground up”, by adding 
suitable security checkpoints and touch points through the software development 
lifecycles. 
 
 
Figure 4 SDL Overview [50] 
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To address the need for secure software, Microsoft has adopted the Trustworthy 
Computing Security Development Lifecycle (SDL), shown in Figure 4. The SDL is 
intended to minimize the number of security vulnerabilities present in the design, coding 
and implementation of software, and to detect and remove these vulnerabilities as early in 
the lifecycle as possible. The need to consider security ‘from the ground up’ is a 
fundamental principle of secure software development [50]. Furthermore, OWASP has 
developed a set of CLASP best practices of software security. OWASP [52] states that: 
“To be effective, best practices of software security must have a reliable process to guide 
a development team in creating and deploying a software application that is as resistant as 
possible to security vulnerabilities.” OWASP, therefore, recommends that the CLASP 
[52] best practices should form the basis of all security-related software development 
activities throughout the software development lifecycle. Also, McGraw [3] points out 
that security can be integrated into software development lifecycles and proposes seven 
touch points as depicted in Figure 5. These touch points are considered a small, 
manageable set of best practices for software practitioners to apply during software 
development, based on the artifacts they already produce.  These software security best 
practices have their basis in good software engineering; they involve integrating security 
throughout the software development lifecycle. 
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Figure 5 Seven TouchPoints for Software Security[3] 
 
A number of researchers have argued the need to consider security from the early 
stages of software development lifecycles, from the early requirements until coding and 
maintenance [51]–[54][55]–[57]. One of the popular models for integrating security into 
the SDLC in the requirements phases is misuse case, which is based on the use case 
approach. Use cases document functional requirements of a system by exploring the 
scenarios in which the system may be used. Scenarios  are  useful  for  eliciting  and  
validating  functional  requirements  [51], but are less suited for determining security 
requirements which  describe  behaviors  not  wanted  in  the  system.  Similar  to  anti-
goals  [52],  misuse  cases are a negative form of use cases and thus are use cases from 
the point of view of an actor hostile to the system [58]. They are used for documenting 
and analyzing scenarios in which a system may be attacked. Once the attack scenarios are 
identified, countermeasures are then taken to remove the possibility of a successful 
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attack. Figure 6  shows  some  of  the  use  cases  and  misuse  case  of  a bank  account  
system.  Use cases are represented as clear ellipses while misuse cases are represented 
with the shaded ellipses. The <<threatens>> stereotype  implies  that  the  given  misuse  
case  is  a  threat  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  requirements  of  the  corresponding use 
case.  The notation we use for misuse cases is based on requirements of the engineering 
process proposed by Sindre and Opdahl [51]. 
 
 
Figure 6 Use and Misuse case of a banking system[51] 
 
 
 
Another use case approach that deals with security requirements is abuse case [59]. 
This approach uses UML use case diagrams for presenting unwanted behavior of a piece 
of software. In this approach, the abuse case model is developed and used to present the 
harmful interaction between a normal user (an actor) and the abuse cases. Also, many 
approaches extended the normal UML for modeling software security such as 
SecureUML and UMLsec [13] [14] among others. This is because UML does not 
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originally cover non-functional characteristics (including security) in an explicit way. It is 
possible to analyze and represent vulnerabilities in the target system, and the 
vulnerabilities can be mitigated from the viewpoints of structure and dynamic behavior. 
SecureUML [56]  focuses on modeling  access  control  policies  and  how  these  
(policies)  can  be  integrated  into  a  model-driven software development process. It is 
based on an extended model of role-based access control  (RBAC)  and  uses  RBAC  as  
a  meta-model  for  specifying  and  enforcing  security. RBAC  lacks  support  for  
expressing  access  control  conditions  that  refer  to  the  state  of  a  system,  such  as  
the  state  of  a  protected  resource. Addressing this limitation, SecureUML introduces 
the concept of authorization constraints. Authorization constraints are preconditions for 
granting access to an operation. UMLsec [57] is also an  extension  of  UML  which  
allows  an  application  developer  to  embed  security related functionality into a system 
design and to perform security analysis on a model of the system to verify that it satisfies 
particular security requirements. Security requirements are expressed as constraints on 
the behavior of the system, and the design of the system may be specified either in a 
UML specification or annotated in source code. 
Secure software does not mean software that is entirely hack-resilient, with no 
vulnerabilities. Nor does it mean zero-defect software, since such software does not exist. 
Secure software is software designed with security in mind, developed with appropriate 
security controls and deployed in a secure state [46]. A common misconception is that 
secure software is all about technology or code security. While writing secure code is a 
critical component of software development, there is a lot more to consider. A secure 
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software development lifecycle requires the convergence of policy, processes and people 
[46]. These are described as follows: 
 Policies, standards, best practices and procedures should be formulated to establish a 
secure software development methodology. 
 Secure software processes must ensure the incorporation of security into the 
software development lifecycle, including secure programming and software risk 
management. 
 People are vital to any organization; they need to be educated in protecting an 
organization’s data and in developing secure software. 
 
3.2 Exiting Works 
 
This section presents a review of the key studies conducted on the topic of secure 
software development and integration security in various stages of software development 
lifecycles. The objective is to summarize and discuss the results of each study, which 
gives better understanding of the problem in context. 
 
Hadavi et al. [6] have focused their review only on security requirements 
engineering by reporting state-of-the-art and research challenges in security requirements. 
The current knowledge in security requirements and threat modeling has been a synthesis 
and has provided the first step for integrating security requirements in the software 
development process. Furthermore, based on the type of activities and methods, they 
presented more than twenty-three research directions and classified them into five 
categories.   
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Salini and  Kanmani [60] have reviewed the literature to compare and analyze 
different methods of security requirements engineering (SRE). The authors also presented 
a view on security requirements types and issues. Finally, the important activities of 
security requirements engineering have been presented and the identified SRE methods 
are compared based on these activities. 
 
D. MU et al. [61] have focused their research work on security requirements 
engineering process and methods. Additionally, the authors examined the compatibility 
of these process with respect to model-driven engineering (MDE) and risk analysis (RA). 
This evaluation could help in understanding and selecting the SRE processes and 
methods. 
 
Du et al. [62] have performed a literature review and analysis of software security 
requirements engineering development methodologies. The results have been reported 
and investigated with respect to the literature source, research community, publication 
year, research region, security understanding, activities and methods types. Furthermore, 
they divided the identified approaches based on different categorizations: technologically 
driven, process oriented and others, such as the extension of the Unified Modeling 
Language (UML). 
 
Khan and Zulkernine [8] conducted a comparative study that presents a complex 
survey on the requirements and design phases of secure software development. Different 
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activities that should be done in the requirements and design phases have been identified, 
and comparisons between different modeling languages and process are made in this 
study. This study provides the developer with guidelines that help him with selecting the 
best fitting method for building secure software. 
 
Tondel et al. [10] have conducted a related study wherein they focused on the 
tasks recommended in the requirements phase. In this study the authors have surveyed 
concrete techniques for eliciting security requirements. Nine techniques have been 
surveyed, which are presented as a series of well-defined steps that collectively lead to 
the elicitation of security requirements. 
 
Fabian et al. [5] have introduced a conceptual framework for security 
requirements methods. The aim was to compare and evaluate current security 
requirements engineering approaches, such as the Secure Tropos, common criteria, 
MSRA, and SREP, as well as methods based on UML and problem frames. The authors 
have reviewed and assess the methods based on the proposed criteria and have classified 
the identified approaches into six categories (multilateral, UML-based, goal-oriented, 
problem-frame based, risk-oriented, Common Criteria-based). Furthermore, they 
systematically discussed these approaches in four sections (i.e., general description, 
scope, validation and quality assurance, and relation to the conceptual framework). 
Different studies have been conducted to compare and analyze various software 
security approaches for specific security policy such as RBAC modeling and 
documentation. Matuleviĉius and Dumas [63], investigated and analyzed two modeling 
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languages, namely SecureUML and UMLsec, that could help define security policies 
through the role-based access control mechanism. This investigation will help the 
modeler in selecting the appropriate technique for RBAC analysis. Also in a recent study, 
Raspotnig [64] reviewed and compared techniques for safety and security requirements.  
 
Previous systematic literature reviews such as that by Ghani and Yasin [12] have 
focused on security adoption inside an extreme programming model and have explored 
the models or frameworks that relate to secure XP methodologies. It further investigated 
the compatibility of the extreme programming model with software security engineering. 
Similarly, F. Roeser [13] conducted a systematic literature review to identify security 
practices that have been developed and adopted to fit in with Agile methodology. A quick 
review was done to investigate how successful these practices could be if implemented 
using Agile methodology. 
 
A systematic literature review conducted by Mellado et al. [9] focused on security 
requirements engineering. The review considers studies that have incorporated security 
only at the requirements stage of information system development, without paying much 
attention to security across the entire software development lifecycles. Musa [11] used a 
systematic review to investigate the various security development models used to secure 
web applications, security approaches used in the process, and the stages in the 
development model in which the approaches or techniques are emphasized. Moreover, 
one recent research involving a systematic mapping study was conducted by Dasanayake 
[65] to identify various aspects of addressing concerns throughout the software 
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development lifecycles and to study most considered concerns and their variations in the 
SDLC. The considered concerns in this study included security, reliability, 
maintainability and performance. 
 
Our work is on alignment with the previous study in identifying the approaches 
for secure software development from the requirements gathering stage until the 
maintenance stage. Nevertheless, and to the best of our knowledge, no SLR has been 
done in this area before, which covers the entire software development lifecycles 
(SDLC). Software security is a somewhat mature area and both industry and researchers 
are attracted to it. In the field of industry, this topic is of interest in order to avoid severe 
losses due to the consequences of insecure software. Similarly, this topic is attractive to 
the researcher as this area is new and there are many gaps that need to be discussed in a 
systematic way for enhancement and innovation. Both industry and academia can benefit 
from this thesis. In academia, this thesis can provide an understanding of software 
security and the different approaches that can be incorporated in different phases of 
SDLC, as well as the security activities that can be aligned with normal development 
activities. Also, many interested researchers and practitioners can benefit from this work 
by contributing to this area through exploiting the gaps and the limitations identified in 
this work. For example, one researcher may propose an approach that helps security 
testing as there are no more approaches identified at this stage. Furthermore, most of the 
approaches in the coding stage do not cover more vulnerabilities, so new interested 
researchers can contribute to this area by enhancing these approaches to cover more 
vulnerabilities. Moreover, the academic institutions can benefit from this work by 
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updating their programs in computer science and software engineering majors by 
teaching their developer the appropriate security practices and guidelines that help them 
in building secure software. Finally, in industry, this thesis can help in choosing one or 
more of the security approaches that can be injected in the appropriate stage to build 
secure software and apply these approaches in the real industrial environment to see their 
effectiveness.  
 
The main contribution of this study is to add to the body of knowledge of both 
disciplines: security and secure software development lifecycles. Furthermore, we are 
going to assist software development organizations in better understanding the limitations 
of existing software security approaches used in the software development lifecycle and 
to provide other researchers with a firm basis on which to develop of the new software 
security approaches. Moreover, comprehensive mapping studies of the secure software 
development approaches and in which stage these approaches are emphasized, will be 
conducted. Additionally, the most active researcher in software security and the main 
venue of publication of software security will be identified. Finally, the gap and 
limitations in the existing approaches will be studied and analyzed.  
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4 CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
We followed two complementary methods to achieve maximum coverage and to 
make our research more comprehensive as depicted in Figure 7. In order to address our 
research questions, we applied the systematic literature review (SLR) and snowballing. In 
the first method, we identified software security approaches and its limitations that are 
used for incorporating security concerns into software development lifecycles (SDLC) 
and the stages in which these approaches are emphasized via a systematic literature 
review. The most active researcher and publication venue are also identified. We then 
used snowballing as a second method to find the possible limitations and challenges for 
incorporating security concerns into the SDLC. We discussed each of the research 
methods in detail in the following sections. Section 4.1 explains the whole SLR process, 
which includes developing an SLR protocol, cleaning and processing the findings via 
initial and final study selection, validation and filtration using quality assessment 
techniques, and data synthesis and proofreading. Section 4.2 explains in summary about 
the snowballing method for finding the possible limitations of incorporating security 
concerns  and existing software security approaches in the SDLC. 
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Figure 7 Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Systematic Literature Review (SLR)  
 
We have followed the SLR guidelines proposed by Kitchenham and Charters for 
performing an SLR for data collection, since it is a well-defined and rigorous method to 
identify, evaluate and interpret all the relevant studies regarding a particular research 
question, topic area or phenomenon of interest. A systematic review is a defined and 
methodical way to summarize the empirical evidence concerning a treatment or 
technology, to identify missing areas in current research or to provide background in 
order to justify new research. Systematic literature review requires considerably more 
effort than conventional literature review, but provides a much stronger basis for making 
claims about the research questions [14]. Hence, an SLR was an appropriate research 
method for our research, which aims to highlight the security approaches used for 
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incorporating security concerns into software development lifecycles from the 
requirements gathering stage until maintenance and deployment, and identifies the 
possible limitations of doing so from the early stages of the SDLC. 
A systematic literature review protocol was written to provide the details of all steps 
that we have followed in our study; the major steps are described as the following: 
 Constructing a search strategy and then performing the search for relevant studies. 
 Study selection process. 
 Apply quality assessment for the selected study. 
 Conducting data extraction, mapping then analysis of the extracted data. 
 
The details of these summarized points are depicted in the next figure and will be 
described in the next sub-sections. 
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RQ1: What approaches are available for secure software development? 
RQ2: In which stage of the software development lifecycles are the software security 
approaches incorporated? 
RQ3: Which researchers are most active in software security? 
RQ4: What are the main venues for publications on software security? 
RQ5: What are the limitations of each of the software security approaches used in the 
software development lifecycles? 
4.1.1 Search Strategy 
The strategy used to construct search terms is as follows: 
a) At the beginning we have derived the major search terms from the research 
question by identifying the population, intervention and outcome. 
b) We then identified alternative spelling and synonyms for the derived major terms 
to ensure that we don’t miss any related study. 
c) We have verified and checked the keywords in relevant papers. 
d) We have used Boolean operators: “AND” to concentrate the major terms, and 
“OR” to concentrate synonyms and alternative spelling, where the database 
allows. 
e) Finally, we have integrated the search string into a summarized form, if required. 
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Result of a 
The following details of the population, intervention, outcome of relevance and 
experimental designs of interest to the review will form the basis for the construction of 
suitable search terms later in the protocol. 
Population: is the application area, in this context it is the software security  
Intervention: the existing approaches for secure software development lifecycles 
Outcome of relevance:  secured software development lifecycle approaches, secured 
SDLC processes, models of security. 
Experimental design: SLR, empirical studies, case studies, theoretical studies, expert 
observation and expert opinions. 
The above details for the RQ1 and the result of RQ1-4 will come automatically from the 
identified studies in RQ1. However, snowballing has been used for answering RQ5 as we 
mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
Result of b 
Approach: 
 
"secure development methodologies" OR "security principles" OR "security standards" 
OR  "security practice"  OR "framework" OR "approach" OR "technique" OR "model" 
OR "method" OR "tool" OR  "development “practices" OR "development guidelines" OR 
"best practice" OR "engineering process" OR "security activities" OR "development 
cycle" OR "development guideline" OR "development principle" OR "development 
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procedure" OR "development approach" OR "development lifecycle" OR "development 
model" OR "development framework" OR "development practice" 
Software security: 
"software quality " OR "software safety" OR "information security" OR "software 
vulnerability" OR " application security” OR"  "secure" OR "insecure" OR "software 
security" OR "confidentiality" OR" authorization" OR "authentication" OR "integrity" 
OR "access control" OR "secure system" OR "secure application" OR "secure software" 
OR "authentication" OR "privacy" OR "access control" OR "confidentiality" OR 
"secrecy" OR "integrity" OR "availability" OR "auditability" OR "authorization" OR 
"threat model" OR "attack model" OR "intrusion detection" OR "information flow" OR 
"encryption" 
 
Software development lifecycles: 
"software development" OR "systems development" OR "software development 
lifecycle" OR "SDLC" OR "software development process" OR "software development 
activities" OR “early development stages” OR "engineering process" OR "software 
development methodologies" OR "application development process" OR "secure IS 
development" 
Result of c 
Approach: 
"development guideline" OR "development principle" OR "development procedure" OR 
"development approach" OR "development lifecycle" OR "development model" OR 
"development framework" OR "development practice” 
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Software security: 
Software vulnerability OR Application security OR Secure OR Insecure OR Software 
security 
 
Software development lifecycles: 
"secure software development" OR "secure systems development" OR "secure software 
development life cycle" OR "systems development lifecycle" OR "SDLC" OR "software 
development process" OR "secure IS development" OR "software development 
lifecycles"  
 
Result of d 
("development guideline" OR "development principle" OR "development procedure" OR 
"development approach" OR "development lifecycle" OR "development model" OR 
"development framework" OR "development practice”) AND (software vulnerability OR 
application security OR secure OR insecure OR software security) AND ("secure 
software development" OR "secure systems development" OR "secure software 
development life cycle" OR "systems development lifecycle" OR "SDLC" OR "software 
development process" OR "secure IS development"  OR "software development 
lifecycles") 
 
Based on the available access, the following digital libraries were used: 
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 ACM Digital Library. (http://dl.acm.org) 
 IEEE Explore. (http://ieeexplore.ieee.org) 
 Science Direct. (http://www.sciencedirect.com) 
 Google Scholar (http://scholar.google.com/) 
 Springer Link. (http://link.springer.com) 
 John Wiley Online Library. (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/) 
Since these libraries differ in their search mechanisms and capability, we tailored our 
search string accordingly. 
4.1.2 Publication Selection 
4.1.2.1 Inclusion Criteria  
The inclusion criteria we have identified to determine which part of literature 
returned by the search string would be used for data extraction. 
 Studies that are reported in English language only. 
 Papers published in any of the primary or secondary resources mentioned 
previously. 
 Studies focused on answering our research question. 
 Source is a research paper, proceeding, book chapters, lecture note in computer 
science or journal article. 
 Studies focused on incorporating security form the beginning of software 
development (i.e. from requirements gathering until deployment stage), by 
proposing security concerns or approaches for building security in. 
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 Any study that focused on some kind of approaches and techniques to follow in 
order to carry out security activities during the phases of software development. 
4.1.2.2 Exclusion Criteria  
 Studies that were not relevant to the research questions. 
 Manuscripts written in non-English language were excluded. 
 Studies with poor English were excluded as the sentences may cause 
ambiguity or exposes conflicts of ideas. 
 Graduation projects, Master’s thesis and PhD dissertations were excluded as 
they tend to be much more focused and there is no evidential proof of any 
review. 
 The paper only mentions security as a general introductory term. 
 Studies focused on software security in the later stages after deployment. 
 Studies focused on security through penetrate and patch or that concentrated 
on secure software using external devices such as firewalls and other 
protection mechanisms. 
 Studies that focused on information security mechanisms such as encryption 
and decryption. 
4.1.3 Selection Primary Sources 
The selection process had mainly two phases as planned in the review protocol: 
an initial selection from the search results based on reading the title and abstract of the 
paper; then by final selection from the first step by reading the full paper. These 
processes are depicted in Figure 9. 
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text 
Figure 9 Selection Process 
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The total number of results retrieved after inputting the search terms in the 
electronic databases are shown in Table 1 Primary Studies Selection from different 
resources. After the initial round of screening by reading the title and abstract, about 184 
studies belonging to five different electronic research databases were selected. After the 
full text readings in the second screening, 118 primary studies were finally selected, 
which met our inclusion and quality criteria. 
 
Table 1 Primary Studies Selection from different resources 
Resources  
Total Result Initial Selection Final Selection 
IEEEXplore  1880 75 53 
ScienceDirect 506 35 15 
SprinerLink 437 39 25 
ACM 140 28 24 
John Wiley 93 7 1 
Total 
 
3056 
 
 
184 
 
118 
4.1.4 Quality Assessment 
In addition to the inclusion/exclusion criteria, the quality of each primary study 
was assessed by the quality checklist for quantitative studies. The quality assessment was 
performed after we finished the final selection of publications; for any paper to pass the 
initial phase, a quality assessment was done. We have to assess the quality of the 
literature selected after final selection for quality. The quality assessment activity for the 
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relevant literature was carried out at the same time during the extraction of relevant data 
so as to ensure that a valuable contribution was made to the SLR. We will detail a quality 
assessment checklist that will provide the means to quantitatively asses the quality of the 
evidence presented by these studies. However, these checklists are not meant to be a form 
of criticism criteria, as such will be documented. These quality criteria were prepared as 
shown in Table 2. Each question in the quality checklist was answered with ‘Yes’ or 
‘No’, and marked by 1 and 0 respectively. The final score of the study ranged from 0 to 
6, where 0 is the lowest score, representing lower quality, and 6 is the highest score, 
representing high quality studies, according to our definitions. A threshold value for 
excluding a study from the review was set at 3 points. Since the lowest score for the study 
was 4, all the studies were included on the basis of the quality checklist. 
Table 2 STUDY QUALITY ASSESSMENT TABLE 
Criteria  Notes  
The approach is explained sufficiently. 
Yes =1 
No =0 
Evidence of the approach is documented. 
Yes =1 
No =0 
Does the study state clear, unambiguous aims of the research? 
Yes =1 
No =0 
Is there any empirical evidence on the findings? 
Yes =1 
No =0 
Is the paper well/ appropriately referenced? 
Yes =1 
No =0 
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Is the paper legible and well written? 
Yes =1 
No =0 
 
4.1.5 Data Extraction 
After the final selection of primary studies, depending upon the quality 
assessment criteria, we have to start with the data extraction phase of the systematic 
literature review process. We used the data extraction form to extract the data. The data 
was extracted by a single reviewer, who was alone responsible for data extraction, and 
then assessed by a PHD supervisor in a random manner. Table 3 represents the data 
extraction form which was used for the purpose of extracting relevant data from primary 
studies. 
The data extracted from the primary studies was saved as a Microsoft Word 
document in <paper id> _ <author name> _ <Year of publication>, while a tool called 
Mendeley was used for reviewing and controlling the selected primary study. 
Table 3 Data Extraction Form 
Data Item Value  
Supplementary 
Notes 
Study Information Data 
Paper ID   
Title    
Date of publication    
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Author    
Year of publication    
Reference type Journal/Conference/Thesis/Unpublished  
Geographical location   
University/organization   
Publisher    
Methodology/ Type of 
study 
SLR/Interview/Case 
Study/Report/Survey 
 
Data Relevant to Answering Research Questions 
Security Approach    
SDLC phase    
Venues for Publication   
Active Researcher   
 
4.1.6 Data Synthesis 
After the extraction of data we used the data synthesis form as shown in Table 4, 
to summarize and compile the extracted data from the primary studies so as to answer 
each of the research questions. This form helps to carry out various types of statistical 
analyses so as to draw a conclusion.  
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Table 4 Data Synthesis Form 
RQ1 - 4 
Security 
Approach 
SDLC 
Stage 
Venue of 
Publication 
Type of 
the 
Study 
Geographical 
Location 
Reference 
Type 
Active 
Researcher 
       
 
Due to the nature of the research questions we are going to synthesis the extracted 
data by checking the most frequent approaches that were used for incorporating security 
concerns into the SDLC and the most frequent phases, where the security approaches are 
emphasized. This categorization will help in identifying the most neglected stage in terms 
of security so the new room will be opened for further research. 
Additionally, we are going to analyze studies based on the countries where they 
were conducted, the active researchers, and on the publication venue where the 
publication channel of the study. 
4.2  Snowballing  
With our search string used in the SLR we could not identify enough number of 
papers for RQ5. So it was decided to use alternative search, i.e., snowballing.  
 
In addition to the searches in the databases using search strings, snowballing from 
the list of references of the identified articles was used as another method in this research 
(i.e., to identify additional relevant articles through the reference lists of the articles found 
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using the search strings and articles identified through manual search using Google 
Scholar to answer the RQ5. Both backward snowballing from the lists of references and 
forward snowballing which is finding the citations to the papers, were included in this 
research.  
 
The snowballing search method [66] can be summarized in three steps: 1) Start the 
searches in the leading journals and / or the conference proceedings to get a starting set of 
papers. 2) Go backward by reviewing the reference lists of the relevant articles found in 
step 1 and step 2 (iterate until no new papers are identified); and 3) go forward by 
identifying articles citing the articles identified in the previous steps. Based on Webster 
and Watson [66] as well as Wohlin [67], the starting point for the backward snowballing 
research approach is the analysis of main contributions to the topic. Thus, we identified 
our starting sets of papers using the common primary studies that have been identified 
through databases automatic search using a search string that presented common 
approaches found in the literature, such as misuse case, Secure Tropos, KAOS, UMLsec, 
secureUML and static and dynamic analysis among others. Also, the systematic literature 
reviews that have been identified through manual search using Google Scholar are 
included in the starting sets of papers. A manual search through Google Scholar using 
terms such as “challenge" OR "limitation" OR "problem" OR "difficulties" OR "trouble" 
OR "issue" OR "weakness” and integrated with terms such as “secure software 
development”, “software security”, “secure early stage of software development stages” 
OR “secure information system development” were used to find starting sets. The 
snowballing procedure is outlined in steps in Figure 10[67]. 
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Figure 10 The Snowballing Process [67] 
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We retrieved approximately fifty-three papers using the snowballing process. After 
applying the selection criteria, we selected forty-seven papers for data extraction and 
analysis.  Total 165 primary studies from SLR and Snowballing were selected that met 
our inclusion criteria and quality assessments are shown in Table 5. For the others, 
meaning this articles doesn’t include to any of the mention digital library and it comes 
from different journals and conferences. 
 
Table 5 Results (SLR + Snowballing) 
Resources  
Total 
Result(SLR) 
Initial 
Selection(SLR) 
Final 
Selection(SLR) 
Snowballing  Duplication 
IEEEXplore  1880 75 53 18 2 
ScienceDirect 506 35 15 3 1 
SprinerLink 437 39 25 6 1 
ACM 140 28 24 5 1 
John Wiley 93 7 1  - 0 
Others  - - - 15 0 
Total 
    
118 47 5 3056 184 
    
Total  165 
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5 CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this chapter we present the results and analysis from our two-phased research 
methodology. Section 5.1 explains the findings from the SLR that answer our research 
questions mentioned in the protocol. Section 5.2 answers the missing articles regarding to 
RQ5, which aimed to identify the limitations and challenges of incorporating security 
into software development lifecycles. 
5.1 Systematic Literature Review (SLR) Results  
 
This section presents the initial SLR-based literature survey results. The total 
number of results retrieved after inputting the search terms in the electronic databases is 
shown in Table 1. After an initial round of screening by title and abstract, about 184 
studies belonging to five different electronic research databases were selected. After full 
text readings in the second screening and the application of inclusion and exclusion 
criteria, about 118 primary studies were finally selected. We analyzed each publication 
and extracted about 54 relevant approaches for incorporating security into different stages 
of SDLC. These approaches have been categorized (for better understanding) mainly into 
seven main categories shown in Table 6. Also, the list of 54 identified approaches for 
injecting security into SDLC and the phases in which this approach are incorporated 
shown in Table 7. (For more details of these security approaches please see Appendix 
A). 
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Table 6 Approaches Categorization 
Group Approach 
Reverse approach 
(Consider security requirements in a reverse way, e.g. 
identifying problems or attacks that may subvert the security 
of software systems). 
Abuse frame  
Misuse cases 
Abuse case 
Essential Use case 
Process Oriented  
(Proper steps, procedures activities to guide the 
participants.) 
 
SREF  
Apvrille and Pourzandi 
Van Wyk and McGraw 
Microdoft SDL 
 Software Security Assessment 
Instrument (SSAI) 
S2D-ProM 
SREP 
ISDF 
SQUARE  
CLASP 
AEGIS 
UML-based approaches  
( Approaches that make use the Unified Modeling Language 
notations)  
 
UMLintr 
Georg-AO 
Gomaa-UML 
YU-AC 
FDAF 
Kim-Access Control 
Mariscal-AC 
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Medina-DB 
PbSD 
UMLsec 
SecureUML 
UML state charts  
Hoisl-SOA 
UML- AC 
UMLS 
Notations 
(Specify and present security specification (security 
properties, attack specification, security requirement) using 
new proposed notations.) 
 
ADM-RBAC 
AMF 
Xu-Petri 
Giordano-Access Control 
Buyens-LP 
SECTET 
AsmLSec 
AsmL 
SecureSOA 
Vulnerabilities-Mitigation approaches 
 (Dealing with common security vulnerabilities in the coding 
phase such as BOF, XSS, SQLI  ...) 
Static analysis 
Dynamic analysis  
Hybrid analysis  
Secure programming  
Program transformation  
Patching  
Goal-oriented  Approaches KAOS 
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Extended for goal oriented modeling approaches that 
focuses on describing both organizational environment of a 
system and a system itself. Also, it extended for specifying 
the anti-goal and constrains of the systems. 
 
SecureTropo 
Others  
(specific to certain technology or development methodology) 
HTTPUnit 
Vela-DB-XML 
SRS-Tool 
Agile Security Framework(ASF) 
STS-Tool 
Gupta- Framework 
FDD 
 
 
 
Table 7 List of Security approaches 
# 
Approach  Phase References  Freq. 
1 
Abuse Frame Requirement  [68] 1 
2 
SREF Requirement  [69] [70] 2 
3 Apvrille and Pourzandi Across [54] 1 
4 Van Wyk and McGraw Across [71] 1 
5 Microdoft SDL Across [50] [72] 2 
6 Software Security Assessment 
Instrument (SSAI) Across 
[73] 1 
7 S2D-ProM Across [74] 1 
8 Misuse cases Requirement [51] [75] 2 
9 
Abuse case 
Requirement and 
Design 
[59] 1 
10 UMLintr Requirement [76] 1 
11 AsmLSec Requirement [77] 1 
12 ADM-RBAC Design [78] 1 
13 AMF Design [79] 1 
64 
 
14 Georg-AO Design [80] 1 
15 Gomaa-UML Design [81] 1 
16 SecureSOA Design [82] [83] 2 
17 UMLsec Design [84] [85] [53] [57] [55] [86] 3 
18 Xu-Petri Design [87] 1 
19 YU-AC Design [88] 1 
20 
KAOS Requirement [52] 1 
21 
 HTTPUnit 
Requirement, 
design , coding 
[89] 1 
22 
Dynamic analysis Coding 
[90] [91] [92] [93] [94] [95] 
[96] [97] [98] [99] [100] 
[101] [102] [103] [104] [105] 
[106] 
17 
23 
Static analysis Coding 
[107] [108] [109] [110] [111] 
[112] [113] [114] [115] [116] 
[117] [118] [119] 
13 
24 
Hybrid analysis Coding 
[120] [121] [122] [123] [124] 
[125] 
6 
25 
Secure programming  Coding [126] [127] [128] [129] [130] 5 
26 Program transformation Coding  [131] [132] [133] [134] 4 
27 
Patching  Coding  [135] [136] [137] [138] 4 
28 SREP Requirement [139] [140] [141] 3 
29 
SecureTropo 
Requirement, 
Design , Coding 
[142] [143] 2 
30 FDAF Design [144] [145] 2 
31 Giordano-Access Control Design [146] 1 
32 
Kim-Access Control Design [147] 1 
33 
Mariscal-AC Design [148] 1 
34 Medina-DB Design [149] [150] [151] 3 
35 
PbSD Design [152] [153] 2 
36 Vela-DB-XML Design [154] 1 
37 SecureUML Design [56] [155] [156] 3 
38 
UML state charts Requirement [157] 1 
39 
SRS-Tool Requirement [158] 1 
40 SECTET Design [159] [160] 2 
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41 
Buyens-LP Design [161] 1 
42 
Hoisl-SOA Design [162] 1 
43 
UML- AC Design [163] 1 
44 UMLS Design [164] 1 
45 Agile Security 
Framework(ASF) Across 
[165] 1 
46 
ISDF Across [166] 1 
47 EUC Requirement [167] 1 
48 STS-Tool Requirement [168] 1 
49 Gupta- Framework Requirement [169] 1 
50 
SQUARE  Requirement [170] [171] 2 
51 CLASP Requirement [172] [173] 2 
52 AEGIS Requirement [174] 1 
53 AsmL Requirement [175] 1 
54 
FDD 
Requirement - 
Design 
[176] 1 
 Total 118 
 
5.1.1 Approaches Frequency Analysis 
 
Table 8 Approaches Freq. Analysis 
# Approach Freq.(118) % 
1 Dynamic analysis 17         14.41  
2 Static analysis 13         11.02  
3 UMLsec 6           5.08  
4 Hybrid analysis 6           5.08  
5 Secure programming  5           4.24  
6 Program transformation 4           3.39  
7 Patching  4           3.39  
8 SREP 3           2.54  
9 Medina-DB 3           2.54  
10 SecureUML 3           2.54  
11 SREF 2           1.69  
12 Microdoft SDL 2           1.69  
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13 Misuse cases 2           1.69  
14 SecureSOA 2           1.69  
15 SecureTropo 2           1.69  
16 FDAF 2           1.69  
17 PbSD 2           1.69  
18 SECTET 2           1.69  
19 SQUARE  2           1.69  
20 CLASP 2           1.69  
21 Abuse Frame 1           0.85  
22 Apvrille and Pourzandi 1           0.85  
23 Van Wyk and McGraw 1           0.85  
24 
Software Security Assessment Instrument 
(SSAI) 1           0.85  
25 S2D-ProM 1           0.85  
26 Abuse case 1           0.85  
27 UMLintr 1           0.85  
28 AsmLSec 1           0.85  
29 ADM-RBAC 1           0.85  
30 AMF 1           0.85  
31 Georg-AO 1           0.85  
32 Gomaa-UML 1           0.85  
33 Xu-Petri 1           0.85  
34 YU-AC 1           0.85  
35 KAOS 1           0.85  
36  HTTPUnit 1           0.85  
37 Giordano-Access Control 1           0.85  
38 Kim-Access Control 1           0.85  
39 Mariscal-AC 1           0.85  
40 Vela-DB-XML 1           0.85  
41 UML state charts 1           0.85  
42 SRS-Tool 1           0.85  
43 Buyens-LP 1           0.85  
44 Hoisl-SOA 1           0.85  
45 UML- AC 1           0.85  
46 UMLS 1           0.85  
47 Agile Security Framework(ASF) 1           0.85  
48 ISDF 1           0.85  
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49 EUC 1           0.85  
50 STS-Tool 1           0.85  
51 Gupta- Framework 1           0.85  
52 AEGIS 1           0.85  
53 AsmL 1           0.85  
54 FDD 1           0.85  
 
Total 118      100.00  
 
Table 7 answers our first research question (RQ1) i.e. the security approaches that 
have been used to incorporate security into software development lifecycles present in the 
published literature. Also, it answers the second research question (RQ2) regarding the 
phase in which the identified security approaches are incorporated (i.e. requirement, 
design, coding). (For more details about these approaches please see Appendix A). 
Table 8 depicts the frequency distribution of various security approaches, as cited in 
the literature. Based on our study, dynamic analysis and static analysis approaches were 
cited the most with 14.41 % and 11.02 % respectively. These approaches are one of the 
most proactive security vulnerability detection methods, including buffer overflow and 
SQL injection whether by execution of the code, as in dynamic analysis, or a building 
model analysis of the artifact without execution, as in static analysis (for more 
information please see Appendix A). These percentages may be due to insecure coding 
guidelines and practices such as SQLAI, or as a result of improper input validation. 
Furthermore, this is probably due to the fact that many vulnerabilities present in the 
requirement and design stages will appear again, especially if they are not captured when 
they are presented. These well-known approaches are used to detect security 
vulnerabilities such as BOF, XSS and SQLI in the coding phase of SDLC in a proactive 
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manner, i.e. before the software release. The other approaches range from process, 
modeling language and notations to frameworks ranked in the list, with percentages 
between 5.08 % and 0.85%.  
5.1.2 Lifecycles Phases Frequency Analysis 
 
Table 9 freq. of studies in security SDLC 
Lifecycle Stage Frequency  % 
Coding  52 41.6 
Design 39 31.2 
Requirement 27 21.6 
Across 7 5.6 
Total  125 
  
 
Our second research aspect focuses on the phase in which the security approaches 
are incorporated (i.e. requirement, design, coding) and which stage is covered most by 
studies published in the literature. Based on our review, the stage in the development 
lifecycle where a security approach is emphasized varies in different studies. Table 9 
shows that a significant number (about 41.6%) of studies in this review considered 
security checks around the coding stage of development. This is probably because attacks 
are more likely as a result of improper coding practices, such as SQL injection attacks, 
buffer overflow (BOF) and cross site scripting (XSS). Alternatively, it may be that 
vulnerabilities introduced during requirements and design will manifest themselves in 
code if not detected when they are introduced. However, applying security checks across 
the entire lifecycle has received less attention and is only considered in 7 out of 125 
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primary studies. Similarly, there has not been an empirical study (to the best of our 
knowledge) that assesses whether concentrating security around coding is sufficient or 
not. However, adding security checks across the entire lifecycle, which also includes the 
coding stage, will guarantee more assurances than if they are only introduced during the 
coding stage. Also, we can observe from Table 9 that no results have been identified in 
the testing phase. This may be due to the fact that, when the software enters the testing 
phase, all its functionalities are built so we cannot prevent security flaws and bugs and 
make the software secure, all we can do is find the security issues that exist in the 
software. Furthermore, in the testing phase the tester needs to put himself in the position 
of the attacker, which explains how hard the security testing phase is. Similarly, in the 
maintenance phase, the only thing we can do is find any security issues that exist in the 
software. 
5.1.3 Active researchers Analysis 
 
Table 10 Active researchers Freq. Analysis 
Author #Papers 
Jan Jürjens 6 
 Zulkernine, M. 6 
 Bashar Nuseibeh   4 
 Eduardo Fernández-Medina  4 
Daniel Mellado 3 
Best, B. 2 
Charles B. Haley 2 
Shahriar, H.  2 
 Mario Piattini 2 
 
The third research aspect focuses on the most active researchers who contributed to 
the research topic, which will also help to answer (RQ3). To get an overview of active 
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researchers in this area, we followed a common metric in software engineering [177]. 
This metric works by counting the number of papers published by each author. To keep 
the brevity of the ranking results, we showed the top authors (in order) who have 
published at least 2 papers in the pool in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11 Top 9 researchers in the area 
 
The competition is close, as the second and third ranks tie. The ranking is as 
follows: Paolo Jan Jürjens and Zulkernine, M. (6 papers each), Bashar Nuseibeh and 
Eduardo Fernández-Medina (4 papers), Daniel Mellado (3 papers) and Best, B., Charles 
B. Haley, Shahriar, H., and Mario Piattini each with 2 papers as shown in Table 10. (For 
more information about the active researchers who contributed to the research topics 
please see Appendix A.) 
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5.1.4 Publication Venues and Sources Types Analysis 
The fourth research aspect focuses on the publication venues and source types of 
the published primary studies, which will help to answer (RQ4) (i.e. the most active 
venue of publication that contributed to software security).  
 
Table 11 Distribution of selected studies over source types. 
Publication Channel frequency % 
Conference 54     45.76  
journal 33     27.97  
Symposium 13     11.02  
Book chapter 10       8.47  
Lecture note in computer science 5       4.24  
Workshop 3       2.54  
Total  118   100.00  
 
The selected studies were published in six publication types: conferences, journals, 
symposiums, book chapters, lecture notes in computer science, and workshops. Table 11 
shows the distribution of selected studies over publication types. Conferences, journals, 
symposiums and book chapters are the four main publication types with 45.76% (54 
studies), 27.97% (33 studies), 11.02% (13 studies) and 8.47% (10 studies) of the selected 
studies, respectively. Only 5 studies were published as lecture notes and 3 as workshops, 
as shown in Table 11.  
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Figure 12 Publications venue distribution 
 
Table 12 Top five Publication venues of identified articles 
Publication Venue Type No.  %  
ICSE 2007. 29th International Conference on Software 
Engineering, 2007. 
Conference 6 
       
5.08  
ICSE Workshop on Software Engineering for Secure Systems, 
2009. SESS '09. 
Conference 5 
       
4.24  
Proceedings. Eighth IEEE International Conference on 
Engineering of Complex Computer Systems, 2002. 
Conference 4 
       
3.39  
COMPSAC '08. 32nd Annual IEEE International Computer 
Software and Applications, 2008. 
Conference 4 
       
3.39  
Software & Systems Modeling Journal  4 
       
3.39  
 
Table 12 presents the top five publication venues of some the selected studies, 
their types, the number of studies, and the corresponding proportion against the total 
number of selected studies. Overall, 82 publication venues are identified that cover 
different areas of computer science, such as software engineering, security, networking, 
etc.; which means this study topic has received wide attention in the research community. 
46%
28%
11%
8%
4%3%
Pulication venue
conference
journal
Symposium
book chapter
lecture note in computer 
science
workshop
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One observation that can be made is that there is one leading conference (ICSE), 
workshop (SESS), and journal (Software & Systems Modeling) respectively as the 
publication venues for this study topic. Also, we can note that these three venues are in 
the field of software engineering. This demonstrates the importance of software security 
research in software engineering and other related fields. (For more details of these all 
identified publication venues please see Appendix A) 
5.1.5 Demographic Analysis 
Another aspect that needs to be discussed is the demographic analysis (country and 
continents) of identified publications that have contributed to research topic. 
Table 13 Country frequency analysis 
Country Freq.  %  
USA 43 
        
32.58  
Canada 12 
          
9.09  
Germany  11 
          
8.33  
UK 9 
          
6.82  
Spain 9 
          
6.82  
Italy 8 
          
6.06  
Austria 6 
          
4.55  
 
We ranked the most active countries based on the affiliation of authors who have 
published software security approaches papers. The rationale for this ranking is to know 
which researchers from which countries (as a group) focus more on software security 
(building secure software). If an author had moved between two or more countries, we 
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attributed each of his/her papers to the explicit affiliation information on top of each 
paper. If a paper was written by authors from more than one country, we incremented the 
counters for each of those countries by one. 
 
 
Figure 13 Country contributed to Software Security 
 
It is important to note that Table 13 and   Table 13 shows primary studies 
originating from 28 different countries, because it is vital to examine research from 
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different social and organizational cultures. The results are shown in Table 13 and Table 
13. American researchers have authored or co-authored 32.58 % (43 of 133) of the 
articles in the pool. Authors from Canada, Germany, UK, Spain, Italy and Austria (with 
12, 11, 9, 9, 8 and 6 articles, respectively) stand in the second, third, fourth and fifth 
ranks. Most of the remaining articles were written by researchers from various countries 
that contributed between 2 and 4 articles. This indicates that more studies from different 
countries are needed to account for cultural and social differences that may have an effect 
on research findings. 
Table 14 Continent Analysis 
Continent Freq. % 
Americas   57 
       
42.86  
Europe 57 
       
42.86  
Asia 17 
       
12.78  
Australia 1 
         
0.75  
Africa  1 
         
0.75  
Total 133 
     
100.00  
 
For the continents analysis, Table 14  illustrates the distribution of primary study 
which proposed security approaches over the continents. There are 57 articles are written 
by authors from America. Similarly, 57 from Europe while small amount of 17 papers are 
from Asia. Also, the lowest number of papers have been produced in Australia and 
Africa. This is probably due to that the countries in this regions pay more attention to 
software security as the software systems are more widely used in daily life. 
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5.1.6 Study Strategy and institutional Analysis 
 
Table 15 Study Strategy Used 
Study Types Count 
Case study 54 
Experiment 33 
others 31 
Total 118 
 
Another aspect that we focused on is the different type of study strategies used to 
propose security approaches presented in the literature. Table 15 gives a summary of each 
type of study strategy found in the published literature. We have grouped the papers 
found through SLR into three study strategies, which are commonly used in empirical 
software engineering as, shown in Table 15. These study strategies were classified as 
case studies or experiments. In addition, some articles that could not be clearly classified 
with the above categories were placed in the ‘other’ category and the count of these 
articles was 31. The ‘other’ category mainly included articles that have developed a new 
tool, evaluated it and demonstrated it. Furthermore, some of studies developed a new 
programming language that somehow provides security by its nature. We can observe 
from the search strategy type, there are no more systematic literature reviews or 
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systematic mapping studies in this topic, which supports our contribution that few SLRs 
contribute to the topic and no SLR covers all the SDLC. 
Table 16 Institution Analysis 
Institution Country Freq.(139) % 
Queen's University Canada 10 7.19 
University of Castile–La Mancha (UCLM) Spain 7 5.04 
The Open University UK 5 3.60 
Univ. of California USA 4 2.88 
Virginia University USA 4 2.88 
 
Also, an institutional analysis has been conducted to see an institution’s 
contribution to the research topic. In the 118 papers reviewed, 139 distinct institutions, 
ranging from universities, research institutes and industrial organizations have been 
found. Table 16 illustrates popular institutions that have contributed to the topic with 
more than 3 papers. The Queen’s University in Canada obtained the first rank, followed 
by University of Castile–La Mancha (UCLM) in Spain, with 7.19% and 5.05% 
respectively. The rest of the institutions contributed between one and three publications 
on the topic. 
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5.2 Snowballing and SLR Results for RQ5 
 
This section presents the initial snowballing-based literature survey results. Of the 
total number of results retrieved by both types of snowballing (i.e. backward and forward 
snowballing), 47 studies presented the limitations and challenges of incorporating 
security into different stages of SDLC. In addition to searches of in the databases using 
the search string, snowballing from the list of references of the identified articles was 
used as another method in this research, i.e. to identify additional relevant articles 
through the reference lists of the articles found using search strings and articles identified 
through a manual search using Google Scholar to answer RQ5. Both backward 
snowballing from the lists of references and forward snowballing by finding citations to 
the papers were included in this research. We analyzed each publication and extracted 
limitations, whether for specific approaches or in general (i.e. limitations of building 
security from the beginning of software development). Table 17 shows the all the 
limitations and challenges for existing software security approaches whether for specific 
approach or in general (i.e. what make building security is harder from the early stage of 
SDLC). The total primary studies 165 were selected using both SLR and snowballing, 
these studies were analyzed for achieving our second objectives to identify existing 
software security approaches limitations in SDLC. Table 17  Shows the limitations and 
challenges of existing software security approaches in SDLC. Also , table 18 shows the 
limitations categorizations based on the approaches types. 
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Table 17 Limitations and Challenges 
# Limitations and challenges  Approach  References  
1 Lack of analyzing of security threats and derive of 
security requirement using the problem frame 
(Requirement elicitation approaches).  
Abuse Frame 
[68] 
2 Inadequate of security requirement (definition). SREF [69] [70] 
3 Lack of awareness of security concerns within 
development team. 
Apvrille and 
Pourzandi 
[54] 
4 Disconnected between security and software 
development. 
Van Wyk and 
McGraw 
[71] 
5 Lack of security activities within normal SDLC. Microdoft SDL [50] [72] 
6 
Lack of security activities within normal SDLC. 
Software 
Security 
Assessment 
Instrument 
(SSAI) 
[73] 
7 Lack of security engineering expertise between 
engineer and developer to check the level of security. 
S2D-ProM 
[74] 
8  Use case is poor at supporting security 
requirements. 
 Limited support of security threats and 
requirement using use case. 
Misuse cases 
[51] [75] 
9 Lack of expertise to derive security requirements 
between development team. 
Abuse case 
[59] 
10 Lack of specifying intrusion detection in UML 
notations. 
UMLintr 
[76] 
11 Lack of specifying attack scenarios specification in 
modeling language. 
AsmLSec 
[77] 
12 Unsupported of specifying access control security 
property in designing web applications. 
ADM-RBAC 
[78] 
13 Lack of supporting security concerns in SDLC 
(authorization access control). 
AMF 
[79] 
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14 The need of Integrating security concerns in design 
level. 
Georg-AO 
[80] 
15 Absence of separating between security concerns and 
business requirement.  
Gomaa-UML 
[81] 
16 Lack of presenting and analyzing security policies 
with in the participant of SOA. 
SecureSOA 
[82] [83] 
17 Lack of security information and modeling security 
properties in UML diagrams. 
UMLsec 
[84] [85] 
[53] [57] 
[55] [86] 
18 Lack of modeling and verifying of secure software 
and threat behavior. 
Xu-Petri 
[87] 
19 Lack of presenting and analyzing of security 
properties using UML. 
YU-AC 
[88] 
20 Lack of considering and specifying security in 
KAOS (goal oriented approach that used in the 
requirement phases). 
KAOS 
[52] 
21 Lack of security concerns specification in Agile 
development. 
 HTTPUnit 
[89] 
22 
 Limited to some security vulnerabilities such as 
Buffer overflow, cross site scripting and SQL 
injection, while other vulnerabilities such as cross 
site request forgery and format string bug does 
not addressed by this approaches. 
Dynamic 
analysis 
[90] [91] 
[92] [93] 
[94] [95] 
[96] [97] 
[98] [99] 
[100] [101] 
[102] [103] 
[104] [105] 
[106] 
23  Suffer from false positives and false negatives. 
 Only support high level language such as PHP , 
Java and C. 
 Limited to some type of vulnerabilities such as 
Buffer overflow, format string bug and SQL 
injection, while other vulnerabilities such as cross 
Static analysis 
[107] [108] 
[109] [110] 
[111] [112] 
[113] [114] 
[115] [116] 
[117] [118] 
[119] 
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site scripting and cross site request forgery do not 
supported. 
24  None of this approaches addressed cross site 
request forgery (CSRF).  
 Limited to analyze code written using scripting 
language such as PHP and JSP, and in procedural 
language (C). 
 Limited to address few types of vulnerabilities 
such as SQLI and XSS. 
Hybrid analysis 
[120] [121] 
[122] [123] 
[124] [125] 
25  Limited to few types of vulnerabilities such as 
buffer overflow, SQL injection and cross site 
scripting. 
 Only two programming language supported by 
this approach (C and JAVA). 
 
Secure 
programming  
[126] [127] 
[128] [129] 
[130] 
26  Limited to some types of vulnerabilities 
(BOF and XSS). 
 Deal with source code written using C and 
Java Script. 
Program 
transformation 
[131] [132] 
[133] [134] 
27  Limited to some vulnerabilities such as BOF, 
SQL and XSS. 
 Limited to code written using C programming 
language. 
Patching  
[135] [136] 
[137] [138] 
28 Lack of standard-based (CC) process that deal of 
security at the early stages of software development. 
SREP 
[139] [140] 
[141] 
29 Security does not supported by Tropo a normal 
requirement elicitation approach. 
SecureTropo 
[142] [143] 
30 Lack of presenting and analyzing of security property 
in UML class diagram. 
FDAF 
[144] [145] 
31 Lack of modeling access control security policy in Giordano-Access 
Control 
[146] 
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the early stage of SDLC. 
32 Need for presenting and analyzing role based access 
control security policy in the design phase. 
Kim-Access 
Control 
[147] 
33 Neglecting visualizing the access control security 
policy in the design phase of SDLC. 
Mariscal-AC 
[148] 
34 The need of eliciting and development security 
concerns in the whole data warehouse development 
lifecycles. 
Medina-DB 
[149] [150] 
[151] 
35 Lack of incorporating security aspect related to 
database access authorization with development 
process. 
PbSD 
[152] [153] 
36 Neglecting of security (confidentiality security 
policy) during the development XML data 
warehouse. 
Vela-DB-XML 
[154] 
37  The need of modeling designs along with 
their security policy. 
 The need of making transition from designs 
and policies to secure systems. 
 Neglecting of engineering security in overall 
development software system. 
SecureUML 
[56] [155] 
[156] 
38 The need of presenting and modeling intrusion 
detection in the early stage using software 
specifications language. 
UML state charts 
[157] 
39 The need of guidance as a security requirement 
development process. 
SRS-Tool 
[158] 
40 Lack of consistent framework and methodologies for 
modeling security concerns within SOA participants. 
SECTET 
[159] [160] 
41 Neglecting of security design principle (Least 
Privilege) by software architects. 
Buyens-LP 
[161] 
42 Demands for a through integration of security Hoisl-SOA [162] 
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features (confidentiality and integrity) in the 
development process of service-oriented systems. 
43 The need of specifying the security policies (access 
control) in the normal software engineering models. 
UML- AC 
[163] 
44  Neglecting confidentiality issue during 
SDLC. 
 The need of UML notations that support this 
issue. 
UMLS 
[164] 
45 
Lack of security practice in Agile development. 
Agile Security 
Framework(ASF
) 
[165] 
46 Lack of knowledge and skills needed of secure 
software system. 
ISDF 
[166] 
47  Lack of security knowledge and skill to 
analyzing and eliciting security requirement 
among software engineer. 
 Neglecting security requirement in the early 
stages. 
EUC 
[167] 
48 Lack of modeling the secure social-technical system. STS-Tool [168] 
49  Absence of presenting security concerns in 
software architectural level. 
 Lack of supporting secure design decision. 
Gupta- 
Framework 
[169] 
50 Lack of systematic security requirement engineering 
in the early stage of software development. 
SQUARE  
[170] [171] 
51 Lack of systematic security requirement engineering 
in the early stage of software development. 
CLASP 
[172] [173] 
52 The need of approach that make a Trade-off between 
secure and usable system. 
AEGIS 
[174] 
53 Lack of writing security requirement (Intrusion 
detections) using normal software specification 
language. 
AsmL 
[175] 
84 
 
54 Absence of integrating security concerns in Agile 
development. 
FDD 
[176] 
55  Knowledge of stakeholders, programmers and 
testers. 
 Disregard of security which results from deficient 
knowledge of stakeholders. 
General 
[178][179][167
][180][181][18
2] [183][184] 
[185][186] 
56 Need for proofing- lack of empirical studies.   
General 
[187][188][189
][190][191][19
2][193][184][1
94] 
57 The need of Security Experts Involvement.   
General 
[195][196][197
][198][199][16
7] [200][190] 
58 Limited to some security concerns. 
UMLintro, 
SecureUML 
[167][201][61]
[184][202][203
] 
59 Suffer from false positive and false negative. 
Static analysis 
[204][205][194
][206][207][20
8][209] 
60 The need of supporting Secure - A Social-Technical. SecureTropos [210] [211] 
[212][213][214
] 
61 Scalability. 
 (This limitation specific to the UML-based 
approaches, the nature of their analysis lead to 
limitations in the complexity of the interactions they 
can support making them unfit for modeling large 
systems.) 
UML-based 
approaches 
(Misuse case, 
UMLsec and 
SecureUML). 
[215][216][217
][214] 
62 Neglecting inside threats.  
The notion of misuse cases cannot explain why a 
misuser attacks the system, and the impact of a 
security use case and a misuse case on other use 
cases 
Misuse cases [218][184][219
] 
63 Does not cover all the coding vulnerabilities.  Static analysis, 
dynamic 
analysis, secure 
programming, 
patching. 
[205][185] 
[209] 
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64 Limited to a few Programming language.  Vulnerabilities- 
mitigation 
approaches 
[205][220] 
[209] 
65 Organizational Impact and business processes. 
This limitation is caused by too much organizational 
focus on time-to-market and the usability of the 
system. Also, software development teams are 
constantly under severe pressure and deadlines to 
meet delivery dates and customer commitments. 
 
General [195][221] 
66 No more comprehensive approach that cover all 
stages.  
General [201][202] 
67 Learnability and understandability. 
The technique is learnable in a definite and 
acceptable time period. Also, there should be clear 
steps and activities for the technique. 
Misuse case [217][216] 
[219] 
68 Traceability. 
Traceability means being able to keep track of the 
history of how models are generated throughout the 
software lifecycle, and how they relate to each other. 
It helps to trace design flaws back to a model when a 
counterexample is detected during the verification of 
less abstract model, or errors are found during the 
testing of the produced system’s infrastructure 
SecureUML , 
UMLsec , 
SECTET  
[222] 
69 Used in the industry. 
  
 :    It has been reported that a small number of 
approaches (processes oriented) have been used in the 
industry, such as Microsoft SDL and CLASP. 
General [8] 
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70 Others UML-based 
approaches 
[214] [184]  
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Table 18 limitations and challenges categorization 
Group Approach Limitations and challenges  
Reverse approach 
(Consider security 
requirements in a reverse 
way, e.g. identifying 
problems or attacks that 
may subvert the security 
of software systems). 
Abuse frame  Lack of analyzing of security threats and derive of 
security requirement using the problem frame 
(Requirement elicitation approaches). 
Misuse cases  Use case is poor at supporting security 
requirements. 
 Limited support of security threats and 
requirement using use case. 
 Neglecting inside threats. 
 Learnability and understandability. 
 The lack of a precise set of guidelines for their 
definition, which renders them unsuitable for 
certain kinds of threats, especially when a large 
number of critical assets are involved. 
 This method also fails to provide guidance on 
when and how identified security issues can be 
tackled and how the produced security 
requirements can be linked to the rest of the 
development process. 
Abuse case Lack of expertise to derive security requirements 
between development team. 
Essential Use 
case 
 Lack of security knowledge and skill to 
analyzing and eliciting security requirement 
among software engineer. 
 Neglecting security requirement in the early 
stages. 
Process Oriented  
(Proper steps, procedures 
activities to guide the 
participants.) 
 
SREF  Inadequate of security requirement (definition). 
Apvrille and 
Pourzandi 
Lack of awareness of security concerns within 
development team. 
Van Wyk and 
McGraw 
Disconnected between security and software 
development. 
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Microdoft SDL Lack of security activities within normal SDLC. 
 Software 
Security 
Assessment 
Instrument 
(SSAI) 
Lack of security activities within normal SDLC. 
S2D-ProM 
Lack of security engineering expertise between 
engineer and developer to check the level of security. 
SREP 
Lack of standard-based (CC) process that deal of 
security at the early stages of software development. 
ISDF 
Lack of knowledge and skills needed of secure 
software system. 
SQUARE  
Lack of systematic security requirement engineering 
in the early stage of software development. 
CLASP 
Lack of systematic security requirement engineering 
in the early stage of software development. 
AEGIS 
 The need of approach that make a Trade-off 
between secure and usable system. 
 Limited to some security concerns. 
UML-based approaches  
( Approaches that make 
use the Unified Modeling 
Language notations)  
)This group of approaches 
cannot serve projects of 
different sizes(scalability 
limitations) 
UMLintr Lack of specifying intrusion detection in UML 
notations. 
Georg-AO The need of Integrating security concerns in design 
level. 
Gomaa-UML Absence of separating between security concerns and 
business requirement. 
YU-AC Lack of presenting and analyzing of security 
properties using UML. 
FDAF Lack of presenting and analyzing of security property 
in UML class diagram. 
Kim-Access 
Control 
Need for presenting and analyzing role based access 
control security policy in the design phase. 
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Mariscal-AC Neglecting visualizing the access control security 
policy in the design phase of SDLC. 
Medina-DB The need of eliciting and development security 
concerns in the whole data warehouse development 
lifecycles. 
PbSD Lack of incorporating security aspect related to 
database access authorization with development 
process. 
UMLsec  Lack of security information and modeling 
security properties in UML diagrams. 
 The resulting models do not express attackers’ 
behavior, and the threat description is limited, 
using the notion of Delete, Read and Insert 
stereotypes to change a state of the subsystem. 
SecureUML  The need of modeling designs along with their 
security policy. 
 The need of making transition from designs and 
policies to secure systems. 
 Neglecting of engineering security in overall 
development software system. 
 Limited to some security concerns. 
UML state charts  The need of presenting and modeling intrusion 
detection in the early stage using software 
specifications language. 
Hoisl-SOA Demands for a through integration of security 
features (confidentiality and integrity) in the 
development process of service-oriented systems. 
UML- AC The need of specifying the security policies (access 
control) in the normal software engineering models. 
UMLS  Neglecting confidentiality issue during SDLC. 
 The need of UML notations that support this 
issue. 
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Notations 
(Specify and present 
security specification 
(security properties, 
attack specification, 
security requirement) 
using new proposed 
notations.) 
 
ADM-RBAC Unsupported of specifying access control security 
property in designing web applications. 
AMF Lack of supporting security concerns in SDLC 
(authorization access control). 
Xu-Petri Lack of modeling and verifying of secure software 
and threat behavior. 
Giordano-Access 
Control 
Lack of modeling access control security policy in 
the early stage of SDLC. 
Buyens-LP Neglecting of security design principle (Least 
Privilege) by software architects. 
SECTET Lack of consistent framework and methodologies for 
modeling security concerns within SOA participants. 
AsmLSec Lack of specifying attack scenarios specification in 
modeling language. 
AsmL Lack of writing security requirement (Intrusion 
detections) using normal software specification 
language. 
SecureSOA Lack of presenting and analyzing security policies 
with in the participant of SOA. 
Vulnerabilities-
Mitigation approaches 
 (Dealing with common 
security vulnerabilities in 
the coding phase such as 
BOF, XSS, SQLI  ...) 
(Limited to a few 
Programming language.) 
Static analysis  Suffer from false positives and false negatives. 
 Only support high level language such as PHP, 
Java and C. 
 Limited to some type of vulnerabilities such as 
Buffer overflow, format string bug and SQL 
injection, while other vulnerabilities such as cross 
site scripting and cross site request forgery do not 
supported. 
Dynamic 
analysis  
Limited to some security vulnerabilities such as 
Buffer overflow, cross site scripting and SQL 
injection, while other vulnerabilities such as cross 
site request forgery and format string bug does not 
addressed by this approaches. 
91 
 
Hybrid analysis   None of this approaches addressed cross site 
request forgery (CSRF).  
 Limited to analyze code written using scripting 
language such as PHP and JSP, and in procedural 
language (C). 
 Limited to address few types of vulnerabilities 
such as SQLI and XSS. 
Secure 
programming  
 Limited to few types of vulnerabilities such as 
buffer overflow, SQL injection and cross site 
scripting. 
 Only two programming language supported by 
this approach (C and JAVA). 
Program 
transformation  
 Limited to some types of vulnerabilities (BOF 
and XSS). 
 Deal with source code written using C and Java 
Script. 
Patching   Limited to some vulnerabilities such as BOF, 
SQL and XSS. 
 Limited to code written using C programming 
language. 
Goal-oriented  
Approaches 
Extended for goal 
oriented modeling 
approaches that focuses 
on describing both 
organizational 
environment of a system 
and a system itself. Also, it 
extended for specifying 
the anti-goal and 
constrains of the systems. 
KAOS Lack of considering and specifying security in 
KAOS (goal oriented approach that used in the 
requirement phases). 
SecureTropo  Security does not supported by Tropo a normal 
requirement elicitation approach. 
 The need of supporting Secure - A Social-
Technical. 
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Others  
(specific to certain 
technology , development 
methodology or general 
limitations) 
HTTPUnit Lack of security concerns specification in Agile 
development. 
Vela-DB-XML Neglecting of security (confidentiality security 
policy) during the development XML data 
warehouse. 
SRS-Tool The need of guidance as a security requirement 
development process. 
Agile Security 
Framework(ASF) 
Lack of security practice in Agile development. 
STS-Tool Lack of modeling the secure social-technical system. 
Gupta- 
Framework 
 Absence of presenting security concerns in 
software architectural level. 
 Lack of supporting secure design decision. 
FDD Absence of integrating security concerns in Agile 
development. 
General (general 
limitation for 
incorporating 
security in 
SDLC) 
 Knowledge of stakeholders, programmers and 
testers. 
 Disregard of security which results from deficient 
knowledge of stakeholders. 
General  Need for proofing- lack of empirical studies.   
General  The need of Security Experts Involvement.   
General  Organizational Impact and business processes. 
General  No more comprehensive approach that cover all 
stages. 
General Used in the industry- only CLASP and SDL.  
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6 CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Traditionally, software security is only considered in the later stages of software 
development with the incorporation of security concerns as an afterthought. As a 
consequence, the risk of introducing new security vulnerabilities into various stages of 
software development lifecycles increases. Research evidence has proven that approaches 
to address security-related concerns are insufficient and could likely cause costly reworks 
in addition to all the intangible consequences caused by a security breach. To avoid these 
costly mistakes, security concerns need to be addressed from the beginning of software 
development lifecycles all the way through to deployment and maintenance. Several 
approaches have been proposed in the literature for incorporating security into the SDLC 
from the requirements gathering phase until the maintenance and deployment, along with 
recommended tools to support a security-centric software development lifecycle. Despite 
the importance of these approaches, only a small amount of research has been carried out 
to investigate the approaches and their limitations in a systematic manner. 
With this focus, we were interested in exploring software security approaches and 
their limitations in the software development lifecycle. This research aimed at exploring 
software security approaches and their limitations in software development lifecycle by 
tackling five research questions. The main results are as follows: 
RQ1: 118 articles were selected using SLR that met our inclusion criteria and quality 
assessments. We analyzed each publication and extracted about 54 relevant approaches 
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for incorporating security into different phases of SDLC. Based on our study, dynamic 
analysis and static analysis approaches were cited the most with 14.41 % and 11.02 % 
respectively. These approaches have been categorized (for better understanding) mainly 
into seven main categories (Reverse approach, Process Oriented, UML-based approaches, 
Notations, Vulnerabilities-Mitigation approaches, Goal-oriented Approaches and Others). 
(More information see section 5.1 – 5.1.1) 
RQ2:  Based on our research, the phase in the software development lifecycle where a 
security approach is emphasized varies in different studies. The result shows that a 
significant number of studies in this review considered security checks around the coding 
phase of development. However, applying security checks across the entire lifecycle has 
received less attention. (More information see section 5.1.2) 
RQ3: The third research aspect focused on the most active researchers who contributed 
to the research topic. To get an overview of active researchers in this area, we followed a 
common metric in software engineering [177]. This metric works by counting the number 
of papers published by each author. (More information see section 5.1.3) 
RQ4: With respect to the publication venue and study type were the selected studies 
published, the selected studies were published in six publication types: conferences, 
journals, symposiums, book chapters, lecture notes in computer science, and workshops. 
Also, Overall, 82 publication venues were identified that cover different areas of 
computer science, such as software engineering, security, networking, etc. (More 
information see section 5.1.4) 
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RQ5: The total primary studies 165 were selected using both SLR and snowballing, these 
studies were analyzed for achieving our second objectives to identify existing software 
security approaches in SDLC. We analyzed these studies and retrieved  various 
limitations and challenges whether for identified existing software security approaches or 
general challenges and limitations. (More information see section 5.2). 
Two research methodologies are used in this thesis: SLR and Snowballing. SLR is 
intended to provide a comprehensive scanning of all the articles targeting the software 
security approaches in software development lifecycles. Its main purpose is to explore 
software security approaches proposed in the literature and to examine which stages the 
identified approaches emphasized. Fifty-four security approaches are identified for 
providing security checks in various phases of software development, and significant 
analysis has been conducted, including demographic analysis to reveal any hidden 
patterns. Furthermore, the publication venues and active researchers who contributed to 
the topic are identified. Snowballing was used as another method in this research to 
identify possible limitations for incorporating security into software development 
lifecycles. Various limitations have been identified, including knowledge of the software 
development teams and the need for security experts to be involved in most of the 
security approaches, especially in the requirements phase. Also, the limitations for each 
software security approaches have been identified as described in the literature. 
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6.1 Contribution 
 
Few research articles discuss the software security approaches in software 
development lifecycles. The articles that exists were produced in the last few years, and 
some carried out reviews and comparison studies on the issue. Most of these reviews 
focused only on secure software development at the requirements engineering phase of 
the SDLC, and others concentrated only on investigating security practices for special 
software development methodologies, such as agile or XP. However, based on our 
research, none of them performed a review focused on software security approaches that 
cover all stages of software development lifecycles in a systematic manner using 
systematic literature review, and none of those reviews documented the systematic 
processes for selecting the primary studies. Also, none of the existing articles explore the 
limitations of incorporating security into software development lifecycles. Our work is of 
high value and can serve as a reference for understanding the various software security 
approaches into software development lifecycles and their limitations. Our research can 
be considered a first stone that assists software development organizations in better 
understanding the existing software security approaches used in the software 
development lifecycle and their limitations. It can also provide other researchers with a 
firm basis on which to develop new software security approaches. 
6.2 Validity 
 
The results of this research are based on systematic literature review and 
snowballing. Despite our extreme care to provide accurate and valid data, a few points 
must be considered when adopting our results. We tried to design our search string to 
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cover all the software development lifecycles from the requirement phase through to 
deployment and maintenance, but a threat to validity stems from the fact we do not 
include all articles that proposed software security approaches which may affect the 
completeness of the study search. To mitigate this threat, we used snowballing as another 
research methods to identify the limitations of exiting software security approaches in 
software development lifecycles.  
6.3 Lesson Learned  
 
This thesis is the result of a full year and a half of work and effort. The experience 
is indispensable, and the obtained knowledge is of great value. Conducting a systematic 
literature review is a very demanding task. It requires reading an enormous number of 
papers quickly and then determining the right ones to evaluate based on quality criteria. I 
have learned how to use the advanced settings on various academic database search 
engines. I have also learned how to use synonyms of terms to retrieve additional relevant 
materials. Synthesizing the results and correlating the information with study types, 
publication venues, and active researchers strengthen my skills as a researcher. I am able 
to see issues from various perspectives and connect them in order to detect any hidden 
patterns. Additionally, I have learned how to use snowballing as a second method in my 
research to identify more results related to specific research questions.  
6.4 Future Work  
 
Our work stems from the fact that there are few articles and reviews that explore the 
software security approaches in a systematic manner, and none of them address the 
limitations of incorporating security into software development lifecycles. As a part of 
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future work, secure software development is an ongoing research area, and we can 
enhance any of software security approaches that have been identified in this research, or 
we can address one of the identified limitations for incorporating the security into 
software development lifecycles. Also, Empirical research in the real industrial 
environment to explore the limitations of software security approaches in SDLC will be 
conducted. 
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APPENDIX 
Software Security Approaches Details 
 
 Approach Description  
1 Dynamic 
Analysis 
(Testing 
Security 
Vulnerabilities
) 
Dynamic analysis is one of the most proactive approaches used for 
mitigating code security vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflow and 
SQL injection attacks, before the software release. The tested program 
implementation is checked with specific input during its execution and 
then both of the computed and expected outputs are compared. Then 
the mismatches between the inputs and expected outputs are checked. 
If there are mismatches between them, the implementation does not 
satisfy the desired security objectives (i.e. requirements) of the 
particular input. 
Three major processes need to be performed in this approach: 
1. Identify the requirements and coverage: Based on the functional 
requirements, it is necessary to identify the security requirements. In 
this case, this is the security vulnerabilities generated by the software 
implementations, invalidated inputs, et cetera. The security breaches, 
such as buffer overflows and SQL injection attacks, are defined in 
advance.  
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2. Generate test case: In this step, the program artifacts such as source 
code and executable code are used for generating test case. Then the 
presence or absence of an attack is determined by the state of the 
program. Various test case generations have been used, including fault 
injection and mutant analysis. 
3. Test case execution: In this step, the generated test case is run 
against the implementation to determine the presence or absence of the 
security vulnerabilities defined based on the attack symptoms. 
Various test case generations are used by these approaches, including 
fault injection and mutant analysis. In fault injection, the input data and 
variable are corrupted, and the program executes with the corrupt data. 
Based on that, the expected responses confirm the presence or absence 
of the vulnerabilities. Also, in fault injection, the user can modify the 
state of the program (i.e. variables or sensitive locations in the code, 
such as functions that control other locations) to check whether the 
program can handle the vulnerabilities. For example, the user can 
change the structure of the HTML file by replacing one tag with 
another and check for the presence or absence of the vulnerabilities. 
Similarly, mutant analysis test generation is a modified implementation 
of the fault injection type. This mutant describes a rule for injection a 
fault.  
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2 Static Analysis Static analysis is one of the most proactive approaches used for 
detecting security vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflow, cross-site 
scripting, and SQL injection attacks, in the program code before the 
software release. Static analysis was developed for compiler 
optimization issues and then used for detecting security vulnerabilities 
due to widespread security issues. Static analysis works by scanning 
one or more source files and creating a representation of the scanned 
source to analyze it. The input program code is examined, specific 
rules, called inferences, are applied to that code, and then a list of 
vulnerabilities that exist in the code is derived. 
Inference is the core part of this approach, in which the code is 
scanned. Various types of inference rules of static analysis have been 
proposed, including tainted data flow and annotation inference. In 
tainted data flow inference, the approach marks the input variable as 
tainted, and then their propagations are tracked. Based on that, warring 
is generated if the tainted input participates in sensitive operations. 
Furthermore, in annotation-based inferences, the approach annotates 
the code with interested properties in term of post-condition and pre-
condition and then checks whether the input can be used safely, based 
on the annotation previously created. 
All these tools follow the same pattern when applied to a piece of 
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source code: 
1. Transforming the code to be analyzed into a program model, which 
is a set of data structures that represent the code. 
2. Analyzing the model using different rules and/or properties. 
3. Showing the results to the analyzer. 
3 UMLsec The UMLsec approach is an extension of unified modeling language 
used for securing the development system. It specifies security 
requirements using stereotypes, tags, and constraints. UMLsec uses 
stereotypes as a label in the UML diagram for presenting constraints 
that need to be achieve by the model and tags for specifying simple 
properties of model elements.  
Twenty-one stereotypes have been defined for presenting security 
requirements. These stereotypes can be associated with various 
diagrams to represent security requirements and design specifications 
in the UML model, such as deploy diagram , use case diagram, 
sequence diagram, class diagram, activity diagram, and state chart 
diagram. 
4 Hybrid 
Analysis 
Due to the pros and cons of static analysis and dynamic analysis, a 
huge number of test cases in both dynamic and static analysis produce 
false positive and negative results. Hybrid analysis is a combination of 
the two complementary approaches. To minimize the disadvantages of 
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static and dynamic analysis, this hybrid type only examines the 
suspected vulnerable code by identifying the location of the program 
code that needs to be analyzed and check it against actual exploitations 
of vulnerabilities. Using dynamic analysis, the actual exploitation of 
vulnerable code is verified with input test cases.  
 
5 Secure 
Programming 
Lack of understanding of the programming language, such as data 
types or libraries, and programmers neglecting possible vulnerabilities 
are considered dire practices that contribute to the writing of vulnerable 
code. The secure programming approach supports writing 
vulnerability-free code in such forms as APIs, language, safe libraries, 
and filters. 
6 Program 
Transformation 
The program transformation approach is one of the most popular 
techniques used in transforming vulnerable source code into 
vulnerability-free source code. This approach is categorized into 
source-to-source translation and code rewriting. In source-to-source 
translation, the enhanced source code is generated automatically from 
the vulnerable source code in the same language. In the case of code 
rewriting, the output of the code is rewritten in another processor. For 
example, the user could rewrite the vulnerable JavaScript code to stop 
cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. 
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7 Patching In the patching approach, the processes take place after the attack 
occurs. Also, in this approach, the vulnerable code is identified, and the 
program is modified to remove the vulnerabilities. Two types of 
patching have been proposed, source code patching and environment 
patching. In source code patching, the source code is analyzed to 
identify the vulnerable statements that need to be fixed. This approach 
helps in rewriting the SQL statements in such a way the query structure 
does not change due to malicious code. Also, this approach helps avoid 
the BOF by replacing the unsafe library with a safe equivalent. 
In environment patching, the process is completed without stopping the 
execution. For example, a BOF attack can be avoided by redirecting 
vulnerable functions such as strcpy with equivalent invulnerable 
functions such as strncpy. 
8 SREP 
(Security 
Requirement 
Engineering 
Process) 
SREP is a standard-based process that supports security requirements 
during the early stages of software development lifecycles in a 
systematic manner. This approach is based on Common Criteria as an 
international standard to achieve comparability between the results of 
independent security evaluations of IT products. Also, developing the 
security requirement based on identified a group of activities and roles. 
These activities define the security, assets, and threats and elicit the 
security requirements. Additionally, it uses other approaches, such as 
UMLsec, as assistants to do the proposed activities. Also, this process 
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uses UML cases for modeling security objectives, misuse cases for 
eliciting threats, and groups of templates for ranking threats, attacks, 
and risk. 
Nine activities are involved in this process: 
1. Agree on definitions 
2. Identify vulnerable and/or critical assets  
3. Identify security objectives and dependencies  
4. Identify threats and develop artifacts  
5. Risk assessment  
6. Elicit security requirements  
7. Categorize and prioritize requirements  
8. Requirements inspection  
9. Repository improvement 
9 Medina-DB 
 
Secure engineering processes for data warehouses are proposed. The 
Medina-DB approach models access controls and logging policies for 
databases in UML class diagrams. Tagged values specify the security 
level and roles related to classes. OCL constraints express more 
complex rules. Based on such, UML diagram platform-specific 
implementations for different databases can be generated. In this 
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approach, the transformation between CIM, PIM, and PSM is 
guaranteed. 
10 SecureUML The SecureUML approach is an extension of UML that specifies 
RBAC policies, which are considered security requirements. Also, in 
this approach, the class diagram is annotated with related access 
control information with defined vocabulary. Furthermore, OCL is 
used for specifying the constraints for permissions, resources, and 
actions. Moreover, in this approach, code and PSM can be generated 
automatically. 
11 SREF 
(Security 
Requirement 
Engineering 
Framework) 
The SREF approach is an iterative process that consists of four 
processes for integrating security requirements with requirement 
engineering. The five processes are as follows: 
1. Capture the functional requirements 
2. Find the security goals 
3. Identify the assets which are anything that has a value in the 
organizations 
4. Identify security requirements 
5. Build satisfaction arguments to help verify the satisfaction of the 
security requirement 
12 Microsoft-SDL The Microsoft-SDL approach is a process proposed by Microsoft for 
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 incorporating security into SDLC with various security activities 
during software development. In the requirement specification phase, 
this approach suggests that the security needs and features are 
identified using user demand. Also, various activities have been 
suggested by this process in the design phase, including identifying the 
components that are critical to security, caring about the application of 
least privilege principles, minimizing the attack surfaces, identifying 
entry and access points, modeling the threats and risk analysis on 
components, mitigating threats by identifying the security 
requirements, and other activities for secure design. 
Moreover, various secure coding standards have been recommended by 
this process in the implementation phase and confirmed by using static 
analysis and reviewing the code at the end of the phase. Finally, code 
reviews and security testing should be performed on the complete 
software to verify it for the final step. 
13 Misuse Cases 
 
The misuse case approach is an extension of the use case approach to 
present the unwanted behavior developed in the system. Misuse cases 
are initiated by misusers, and use cases are intimated by normal users 
to achieve functionality. Use cases are used to present the 
requirements, but misuse cases present the security threats. 
14 SecureSOA SecureSOA is a security design language used to define the security 
requirements of service-oriented architectures, which are behaviors of 
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the interaction between the participants in the SOA. The concrete 
syntax of the SecureSOA security design language is stereotype UML 
class. 
15 Secure Tropos The Secure Tropos approach is an extension of a development 
methodology called Tropos. In this approach, various notions have 
been used for actor, goal, soft goal, task, resource, security constraint, 
secure task, and secure resource. An actor can achieve the objective to 
accomplish a goal and depend on another actor. This is called the 
dependee and dependent relationship. 
Security requirements and design specifications can be represented 
using secure Tropos notation as an interaction between different actors 
to accomplish certain goals. Also, this approach uses the I* notation 
language to specify the dependences between different actors. 
16 FDAF (Formal 
Design and 
Analysis 
Framework) 
FDAF uses aspects such as access control to add security properties to 
UML class diagrams. The available aspects can be stored in an aspect 
library and woven into the design at hand when needed. Furthermore, 
FDAF aims to allow the translation of extended UML models to formal 
languages to facilitate formal analysis. Note that FDAF is not limited to 
security and also considers performance. Building a role-based access 
control to the software architecture of an online banking system is a 
way to illustrate this approach. This approach is used to integrate 
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access control to the architecture design. 
17 PbSD (Pattern-
based Method 
for Secure 
Development) 
The PbSD utilizes the security pattern to enforce the security in the 
system design. PbSD models templates of common security patterns 
such as RBAC using UML augmented with template OCL constraints. 
It helps the designer, particularly the database designer, create a 
database that complies with the organizational policies relating to the 
authorizations in the early stages of software development. These 
patterns are initiated into application models, such as UML class 
diagrams. The approach has been validated in a controlled experiment 
with students as participants. In the experiment, PbSD is compared 
with plain SQL and Oracle's VPD with respect to modeling access 
control policies. 
18 SECTET The SECTET approach models security requirements for service-
oriented architectures in UML activity and class diagrams. Both 
diagrams are extended with several stereotypes. Furthermore, more 
complex rules are specified with SECTET-PL, an OCL-like policy 
language. It also automatically generates code for a variety of target 
platform technologies. 
19 SQUARE 
(Security 
Quality 
Requirements 
Engineering) 
SQUARE is a comprehensive methodology for integrating security 
from the early stages of the software development process. It consists 
of nine steps: 
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1. Agree on definitions 
2. Identify security goals 
3. Develop supporting artifacts 
4. Perform risk assessment 
5. Select elicitation techniques 
6. Elicit security requirements 
7. Categorize requirements 
8. Prioritize requirements 
9. Inspect requirements 
20 CLASP  The CLASP approach is a group of secure software developments that 
perform based on the roles during development. It suggests that 
security experts should be involved from the beginning of 
development. According to this approach, it has been suggested to use 
risk analysis and threat modeling during the requirement specification 
and design phases. Also, security information has been annotated with 
class diagrams. Security code reviews and static analysis are 
recommended in the security assurance phase. Furthermore, a list of 
common vulnerabilities and how to mitigate them is provided during 
the development. 
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Three activities have been proposed by this process to achieve security 
requirements: 
1. Identify the resources, assets, and roles with the owners and asset 
users 
2. Categorize the resources and assets in classes based on security 
requirements 
3. Identify possible interactions between the resources and assets 
Various security services are identified based on the interaction 
between the assets and resources, including accountability, 
authorization, availability, authentication, confidentiality, and integrity. 
21 Abuse Frame Abuse frame is based on problem frame to define anti-requirements 
(i.e. requirements for malicious users) and abuse frame to analyze 
security threats. Problem frame helps analyze problems to be solved 
where interaction between the software and domains in the system 
context is described. Problem frames are useful in requirement 
engineering because they help with decomposing the system context 
into simpler sub-problems mapped to well-known problem classes. 
This approach is an extension of problem frame, so it utilizes the 
problem to define the system context. The abuse frame is used for 
identifying the malicious users within the system context by finding the 
problem and the sub-problems by utilizing the problem frame. The 
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security need is described as constraints on the identified 
functionalities. The abuse frame diagram is constructed for identifying 
the threats, and the security need is negated to identify the anti-
requirement and present them in the abuse frame diagram. 
Security vulnerabilities, such as ''Limit the number of tries for entering 
passwords,'' are identified, and the security requirements are addressed. 
22 Apvrille and 
Pourzandi 
 
This approach is a process proposed by Aprville and Pourzandi for 
secure software development lifecycles based on their experiences. In 
the requirement phase, the approach used to identify the high level 
security objectives such as confidentiality and availability, for software 
system to be. Also, for the low level, this process uses threat modeling 
for building the security requirements. The prioritization of these 
security requirements is based on the results of the risk analysis. For 
the other phases, this process suggests using UMLsec for presenting 
the design decision. Also, for the implementation phase, this process 
advises using a suitable programming language that achieves the 
security purposes and some security practices for mitigating security 
vulnerabilities, such as FSB and BOF. Finally, for the assurance phase, 
various tools have been suggested for use in this phase, including code 
reviews and static analysis scanner tools. 
23 Van Wyk and 
McGraw 
The Van Wyk and McGraw approach suggests security practices that 
could be applied through the software development lifecycles based on 
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 the long successful experience of the industry. This approach has been 
used in organizations with successful results. One of the methods used 
in the requirement phase is an abuse case. The authors have a lot of 
experience in this field, and they work as consultants in one of the 
leading companies in software security. 
24 SSAI  The SSAI approach is a group of activities that help in developing 
secure software using suitable resources and tools. First, this process 
provides an online database that contains information about 
vulnerabilities and exploitation and mitigation processes. Another 
resource provided by this process is a security checklist that helps with 
developing software in a secure manner. Also, the author explains the 
details about how to build the checklist and the appropriate items that 
can be involved. Moreover, this process categorizes a group of security 
static analysis tools. Finally, the testing tools use security property as 
the first step to test the software. 
25 S2D-ProM 
(Secure 
Software 
Development 
Process 
Model) 
Secure software development activities have been proposed by the 
S2D-ProM process. It suggests using risk analysis during various 
stages of SDLC, such as requirement specification, design, and 
implementation, and the identified risk can be mitigated using security 
mechanisms. Based on this process, risk analysis can be done in 
various phases of SDLC. For example, the user can use personnel 
experience in the requirement phase and design review in the design 
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phase. 
Also, this process proposes flexible options when proceeding from one 
stage to another. For instance, source code can be developed from 
designs based on the secure coding rules or personnel experiences. 
26 Abuse Case The abuse case approach uses UML use case diagrams to present 
unwanted behaviors in a piece of software. In this approach, the abuse 
case model is developed and used to present the harmful interactions 
between normal users (actors) and the abuse cases. 
27 UMLintr The UMLintr approach is UML extension. Different stereotypes and 
tags are used for attacks specification using various diagrams, such as 
use case diagrams, state chart diagrams, package diagrams, and class 
diagrams. Different types of attacks are presented in this approach, 
including remote to user or denial services, and stereotype packages are 
used to present each type. For each class, there are three types of 
stereotypes and 12 stereotypes for each use case diagram. Stereotypes 
also have tags for classes. 
28 AsmLSec 
(Abstract State 
Machine 
Language) 
AsmLSec is AsmL extension  for attack  specifications scenarios. It 
helps identify how the system under development copes with potential 
attacks by using knowledge about past attacks observed on similar 
applications. With this approach, the attacks are represented using 
transitions, states, and events. There is a source and a destination state 
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for each transition. To fire the transition, to achieve the transition from 
one state to the other, a set of conditions need to be met. Moreover, this 
approach has the potential of presenting the attack scenarios in AsmL 
using appropriate compilers, and these attack scenarios can be 
translated as inputs using intrusion detection systems. 
29 ADM-RBAC The ADM-RBAC approach is an extension of the Ariadne 
Development Method (ADM), which is a development model for Web 
systems. ADM divides the development model of Web systems into 
three phases: conceptual design, detailed design, and evaluation. ADM-
RBAC extends ADM with several visual models that specify the role-
based access control.  
30 AMF 
(Assurance 
Management 
Framework) 
The multilayered AMF approach is based on the assurance 
management framework that focuses on the development of the 
authorization system. AMF facilitates comprehensive realization of 
formal security models, security policy specifications, verifications, 
security code generation, and conformance testing. This multilayered 
approach includes four development phases: authorization security 
requirements, authorization model and policy verification, 
authorization system design, implementation using UML class diagram 
and OCL constraints, and conformance testing. 
31 Georg-Aspect 
Oriented 
The Georg-Aspect Oriented approach is based on aspect orientation for 
designing a secure system. It models authentication protocols and 
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possible attacks using UML class and sequence diagrams. By weaving 
an attack into system models, which results in a so-called misuse 
model, it can be investigated whether the system is vulnerable to 
attack. A vulnerable system can be mitigated by weaving an 
authentication protocol into its design to create a security-treated 
system model. 
32 Gomaa-UML 
 
The Gomaa-UML approach describes a way of modeling complex 
application designs and requirements in separate ways from modeling 
security requirements and designs using UML notation, as in use cases, 
class diagrams for static modeling, and collaboration diagrams. It also 
separates business concerns from security concerns to reduce the 
complexity of the requirements and make it possible to maintain the 
system. 
33 Xu- Petri Nets The threat-driven Xu- Petri Nets approach models the intended 
functionality of a system and possible threats using Petri nets, whereas 
mitigations are modeled using Petri net-aspects. Petri nets are a well-
studied formal method with graphical and mathematical notations for 
specifications and analysis of distributed systems. Petri nets can serve 
as a unified formal basis for specifying system functions, security 
threats, and threat mitigations. They are expressive in threat modeling. 
34 YU-AC The YU-AC approach uses UML class diagrams augmented with OCL 
constraints to model role-based access control policies. Scenarios for 
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verifying modeled policies are generated from operation invocation 
patterns. These patterns are manually defined by a designer, and they 
constrain the initial state and allow the sequence of operation 
invocations. The patterns are manually created using the best available 
domain expertise and experience related to the sequences of operations 
that are likely to uncover policy violations. Each generated scenario 
needs to be labeled either legal or illegal, and the policy must accept or 
reject them accordingly. Automatic algorithms for generating scenarios 
are proposed. 
35 KAOS (Keep 
All Object 
Satisfied with 
Intentional 
Anti-Model) 
KAOS is a security requirement driven approach for specifying, 
analyzing, and modeling application security requirements, and from 
these security requirements, security design specifications are derived. 
Also, from the design specifications, the secure code is generated using 
B method. This approach extends KAOS to include the elaboration of 
security requirements using anti-models. An anti-model is constructed 
using obstacles, and an obstacle negates existing goals of the system. 
36 HTTP Unit HTTP unit is a programmable API to detect SQL injection 
vulnerabilities that help the tester emulate the browser in such a way 
that the input form could be accessed and modified as a test case. This 
test case can be checked for the presence of vulnerabilities. This 
approach is especially for Web applications with agile development. 
37 Giordano- The Giordano-Access Control approach proposes a set of visual 
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Access Control languages to model role-based access policies. The visual languages 
are intended to be usable by a broad range of users, from developers to 
top-level managers. Furthermore, XACML policies can be generated 
from the visual specifications. XACML is an XML-based language for 
creating access policies and automating their use in the management of 
access controls for general devices. A group of models for supporting 
access control can be used in this approach, including the supported 
models Role, Permission, Separation of Duties, and Role Assignment 
Diagram. This approach can be embedded into software engineering 
methodologies for specifying access control policies to be enforced 
during the design level of information systems or applications. 
38 Kim-Access 
Control 
The Kim-Access Control approach combines feature modeling and 
UML modeling to incorporate role-based access control policies into 
application models. Feature models define RBAC using UML class and 
sequence diagrams. These feature models are composited into 
application models to define domain-specific RBAC policies. The 
author presents two case studies for the sake of illustration, one a 
banking system and the other a database management system. 
39 Mariscal-AC 
 
The Mariscal-AC approach proposes several extensions of the UML 
class diagram to model access control policies. The secure sub-system 
diagram models the public interface that is subject to access controls. 
The role-slice diagram models the role hierarchy and specifies the 
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allowed and disallowed operations for each role. The user diagram 
models the assignment of users to roles, and the delegation diagram 
models how users may delegate their roles. Access control policies are 
modeled separate from the application design to maintain a clear 
separation of concerns. The approach also provides mapping between 
the modeled policy and the resulting policy and enforcement codes to 
allow tracing and enable code generation. Case studies in the university 
system with prototypes are discussed. 
40 Vela-DB-XML 
 
The Vela-DB-XML approach extends UML to model access controls 
and logging policies for data warehouses. Tagged values in a class 
diagram indicate security levels, such as top secret or confidential, and 
roles, such as administrative or passenger. More complex rules, such as 
log all frustrated access attempts, are modeled as classes. These 
platform-independent models are transformed to platform-specific 
models, which can be transformed to implementations for specific 
databases. 
41 UML State 
Charts 
The UML state charts approach is a combination of abstract state 
machine language (ASML) and UML for specific attack scenarios in 
the requirement specification phase. These attack specifications 
(scenarios) can be transformed to Snort rules and all of these scenarios 
are used with some extensions for system intrusion detections. 
42 SRS-Tool This approach is a security requirement process for development 
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security requirement specifications with a supported tool called SRS-
Tool. It is based on CC and problem profiles and consists of four steps, 
as follows: 
Step 1: Analysis of SCL (security classification level) for organization 
Step 2: Analysis of security environment 
Step 3: Analysis of security requirement 
Step 4: Generation of SRS 
43 Buyens-LP The Buyens-LP approach allows the analysis of software architecture 
for least privilege and separation of duty violations. Based on the 
architecture and its documentation, a Task Execution Model (TEM) is 
derived. The TEM identifies the relations between principals and the 
tasks the system can perform, as represented by the policy defined in 
the architecture. The analysis consists of verifying whether the TEM is 
consistent with the intended policy as defined by the requirements. 
44 Hoisl-SOA Hoisl-SOA is a model-driven approach that extends UML activity 
diagrams, SoaML, and UML4SOA to incorporate security into process-
driven, service-oriented architectures (SOA). The UML activity 
diagram is extended with SecurePin, SecureDataStoreNode, and 
SecureActivityParameterNode elements to represent secure object 
flows at the business. Similarly, SoaML and UML4SOA are extended 
to represent secure object flows at the service level. These models can 
121 
 
be transformed using another step to Web service artifacts, such as 
WSDLs. The SoaML provides essential modeling primitives for 
structural views of a service architecture, including participants, 
collaborations, service contracts, interfaces, and messages. The 
UML4SOA extension is used for modeling macroflow/microflow 
specifications for the participants of a service architecture. 
45 UML-AC The UML-AC approach allows the modeling of access control policies 
using UML class and object diagrams. A UML class diagram called a 
type diagram specifies the entities available for modeling the policies 
and their relations. For example, for a view-based access control 
(VBAC) policy, these entities are object, permission, role, subject, and 
view. Object diagrams are used to graphically model policy rules and 
constraints, and each view must have at least one permission. The 
provided formal semantics based on graphs allows users to analyze 
modeled policies by verifying whether all reachable states or policy 
configurations satisfy all the specified constraints. If this is not the 
case, the developer must alter the policy rules accordingly. 
46 UMLS The UMLS approach extends several UML elements with labels that 
specify access control information, such as ownership and read 
permissions for data. The extended UML diagrams can be transformed 
to Jif skeleton code. At this level, the Jif compiler can validate the 
modeled policy. 
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47 ASF (Agile 
Security 
Framework) 
The ASF approach helps developers by providing step-by-step 
guidance for applying security techniques to achieve a secure software 
system. Also, it introduces security practices at each phase and 
suggests security training for all developers and stakeholders. It 
includes hybrid techniques that are a combination of abuser stories and 
attack trees. 
Different phases have been proposed in this approach, as follows: 
1. Security requirement analysis and planning 
2. Threat modeling and designing 
3. Secure code implementation 
4. Secure deployment 
48 ISDF 
(Integrated 
Security 
Development 
Framework) 
The ISDF approach is an integration of carefully selected security 
patterns into the appropriate stages of the software development 
lifecycle to ensure the security designs are correctly implemented. A 
pattern describes a time-tested generic solution to a recurring problem 
within a specific context. This framework consist of two components. 
The first is secure development best practice, and the second is a four-
stage security pattern. Then the integration between the two 
components is done for security purposes. 
49 EUC (Essential 
Use Cases) 
The processes of the EUC approach begin after the requirement 
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engineer gathers the requirements from the stakeholders. The collected 
requirements are in the form of textual natural language requirements. 
This approach is for supporting and analyzing the capturing process of 
security requirements. Also, it supports capturing security requirements 
of normal business expressed in natural text. Tool support for the sake 
of applying this approach uses three library patterns: security essential 
use case, security essential interaction, and security control pattern. 
The process starts when the textual requirements are analyzed and 
traced to the EUC patterns library for appropriate abstract interaction in 
a form of EUC model (1). Then SecEUC are derived from the 
generated EUC models based on the categorization of their attributes 
related to the security elements, as defined in the SecEUC pattern 
library (2). Each SecEUC is mapped to the EUI pattern library (3) for 
the generation of an abstract prototype in the form of an EUI model. 
Each EUI model is verified with a defined mandatory security control 
in the SecCtrl library pattern (4). Next, a recommendation for a 
graphical user interface (GUI) is provided to visualize the security 
requirements based on the generated SecEUC (5). This helps ensure the 
consistency and the correctness of the captured security requirements 
with the original business requirements provided by the end-user. 
50 STS-Tool The STS-Tool approach is a modelling and analysis support tool for 
STS-ml, an actor- and goal-oriented security requirement modeling 
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language for socio-technical systems. Socio-technical systems consist 
of social actors, such as humans or organizations, and technical sub-
systems in which they interact to achieve their objectives. STS-ml 
includes high-level organizational concepts, such as actor, goal, and 
delegation. It is a diagrammatical language that uses graphical concepts 
and relations to create the models. It also allows modeling with multi-
view modeling that includes the social view, information view, and 
authorization view. The modeling activities consist of five phases: 
1. Model of social view 
2. Information view 
3. Authorization view 
4. Automated analysis 
5. Deriving the security requirement 
51 Gupta- 
Framework 
Gupta framework is a security engineering process that converts 
security requirements and threat into design decisions to mitigate the 
identified security threats. In this approach, different security 
requirements are mapped to different security services. The identified 
design attributes are prioritized, and a security design template is 
prepared. Based on the final design decision, the appropriate 
cryptography techniques are chosen from a prepared repository. 
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52 AEGIS AEGIS is a secure software development process that concentrates on 
security requirement specifications through identifying assets and risk 
analysis. Four design sessions have been proposed between the 
developers and stakeholders: 
1. Software assets and their relationships need to be modeled to 
identify the security properties to associate with the assets using abuse 
cases 
2. Identify software vulnerabilities, threats, and risk 
3. Remove identified vulnerabilities using appropriate security 
requirements 
4. Use other tools, such as static analysis and code review, in the 
implementation phase 
53 AsmL AsmL is a specification language that is an extension of finite state 
machine used for representing security requirements. Also, an attack 
with multiple steps can be captured easily using this approach and 
presenting them as Snort rules. 
54 FDD (Feature 
Driven 
Development) 
The FDD approach is an agile process for secure Web applications. It 
integrates agile feature-driven development processes with risk 
analysis for building secure Web applications. For risk analysis, this 
approach accesses different paths that could lead to possible attacks 
and suggests security controls for each possible exploitation of the 
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different vulnerabilities. At each increment, the added assets are 
identified, and the potential attacks are specified. Various security 
activities are added to the original model to provide security. 
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